Battle of Carillon

Geography

Perched on a spit of land wedged between Lake Champlain and Lake George, Fort Carillon occupied ground where two military currents were bound to collide: French troops descending from Canada and the St. Lawrence Valley across the lake toward the Hudson, and British forces pushing upriver from Albany. Its builders placed it with the waters of Lake Champlain along its eastern edge, and across those waters stood Mount Independence. Just below the fort, to the south, the La Chute River emptied out, carrying the outflow of Lake George. Because this river could not support much boat traffic, travelers instead relied on a portage path running from the top of Lake George down to a sawmill the French had constructed to aid in building the fort. This path forded the La Chute on two occasions, first roughly 2 miles (3 km) from Lake George itself, then again near the sawmill, itself about 2 miles (3 km) short of the fort.

A road leading toward Fort St. Frédéric ran off to the north. Westward, the terrain climbed gently before giving way to Mount Hope, high ground that overlooked a stretch of the portage route without being close enough to threaten the fort directly. Far more troubling in terms of the fort's placement was Mount Defiance, called Rattlesnake Hill during this engagement and later renamed Sugar Bush in the 1770s. Situated south of the fort on the opposite bank of the La Chute, this 900 foot (270 m) elevation combined steep slopes with heavy forest cover, making it an ideal perch from which artillery could bombard the fort below. Montcalm's chief engineer, Nicolas Sarrebource de Pontleroy, summed up the vulnerability bluntly, remarking that if given charge of besieging the place, he would need nothing more than six mortars and two cannon.

Battle of Bernetz Brook

On the morning of July 6, British forces came ashore at the northern tip of Lake George without meeting any resistance. Abercrombie sent an advance party ahead of the main body to scout the intended landing area, and this party discovered that the French had already pulled out, leaving behind some supplies and equipment in their rushed exit. Once the main army had disembarked, it organized into columns and tried to push up the western bank of the stream linking Lake George with Lake Champlain, avoiding the portage trail since Montcalm's men had torn down its bridges. The dense woods, however, made it impossible for the columns to hold their formation.

Close to where Bernetz Brook meets the La Chute, a French detachment under Captain Trépezet, making its way back toward friendly lines, ran into Phineas Lyman's Connecticut regiment, and fighting broke out among the trees. General Howe's column happened to be nearby, prompting him to steer his men toward the commotion. As they neared the fighting, a musket ball struck Howe and killed him on the spot. A separate column of provincial troops from Massachusetts, also pulled toward the clash, managed to block the retreat of the French patrol from behind. The struggle that followed was brutal, leaving roughly 150 of Trepézet's soldiers dead and another 150 taken prisoner. Only fifty men, Trepézet among them, got away by swimming the La Chute, though he would succumb to his wounds the following day.

Accounts differ regarding how many casualties resulted from the clash. According to William Nester, British losses were minor, amounting to just ten killed and six injured, whereas Rene Chartrand puts the figure closer to 100 killed and wounded overall, counting Howe's death among them. Disheartened by Howe's loss, worn down by their night spent on the water, and stymied by the tangled forest, the British troops set up camp among the trees and made their way back to the landing site the following morning.

Aftermath

Fearing the British might strike again and mindful that his men were exhausted from the day's fighting, Montcalm ordered barrels of beer and wine carried up to the lines. Throughout the night his soldiers alternated between snatching sleep and strengthening the defenses, bracing for another assault.

Word of the engagement reached England not long after news of Louisbourg's fall, casting a shadow over the celebrations for that victory. Only later in the year did Pitt learn the full extent of British successes in 1758, including the capture of Forts Duquesne and Frontenac, crucial milestones toward subduing New France. Had Carillon fallen as well that year, the conquest could have concluded by 1758 or 1759. Instead, Montreal, the final holdout, did not fall until 1760, following campaigns launched from Fort Oswego, Quebec, and Carillon itself, seized in 1759 and renamed Ticonderoga by troops under Jeffery Amherst, the commander who had taken Louisbourg.

Abercrombie's military career effectively ended here; he never commanded another campaign. Though he remained at Lake George, his contribution amounted to little beyond backing John Bradstreet's successful strike on Fort Frontenac, sanctioned by a war council on July 13. Bradstreet departed with 3,000 men on July 23, after which Abercrombie declined to pursue further offensive action, citing insufficient troops. Pitt, the British Secretary of State behind the overall strategy, learned of the loss in August and informed Abercrombie by letter on September 18 that the king wished him to return to England. Despite this, Abercrombie's career advanced further, and he eventually attained the rank of full General in 1772. Writing in 1911, James Holden observed that both American and British commentators, past and present, had branded him with terms such as imbecile, coward, unready, and old woman.

The presence of British-allied Indians who witnessed the disaster firsthand strained relations going forward. As word of the loss spread through their communities, it undermined British agents' efforts to enlist Indian support for later campaigns.

The chaotic retreat itself revealed a breakdown in command. A seasoned officer might simply have held position at the Lake George landing, assessed the situation, and initiated siege operations. Instead, Abercrombie, to the astonishment of some subordinates, pulled his entire force back to the southern end of the lake. Nester, finding no better explanation, suggests the general simply lost his composure.

Historians have scrutinized the conduct of both commanders at length. Montcalm's performance, though generally sound, overlooked certain tactical possibilities, and some choices in fortifying Carillon remain questionable. Abercrombie's decisions, by contrast, have drawn near-universal criticism, and the consensus among scholars brands him an incompetent leader.

Both men were shaped by European warfare, conducted largely on open ground where movement came easily, leaving them ill-suited to fighting in the forest. Neither cared for the irregular tactics favored by Indians or by units like Rogers' Rangers, viewing them merely as unavoidable given the terrain. Although French forces relied heavily on Indian allies to offset their smaller numbers throughout the war, few fought in this engagement, partly because Montcalm held a general distaste for them and their methods.

Montcalm especially might have gained from adopting more irregular tactics. He seems never to have examined the landing site at the lake's north end, a spot from which he could have opposed the British landing directly. Using the narrow woodland terrain there, the French might have offset British numerical strength and disputed the entire portage road. That fortifications were built along this road only to be later abandoned points to a lapse in strategic foresight. According to Nester, contesting the first river crossing on the portage road alone would have bought Montcalm an