Helena

Background

South Carolina broke away from the Union in December 1860, driven by a series of conflicts with the federal government in which slavery stood as the primary issue. Other states across the Deep South followed suit in early 1861, joining together to establish the Confederate States of America. The war itself opened on April 12, when Confederate artillery opened fire on Fort Sumter. Soon afterward, newly elected President Abraham Lincoln issued a call for 75,000 volunteers to crush the rebellion, and this appeal pushed Arkansas toward secession and entry into the Confederacy.

During 1861, combat had already broken out farther north in Missouri. Then, in the first days of March 1862, Confederate troops suffered defeat in the northern part of Arkansas at Pea Ridge. Union forces capitalized on that success starting in late April, pushing into Arkansas and putting pressure on Little Rock, the state capital, before taking control of Helena, a town along the Mississippi River, on July 12.

Control of Helena gave the Union several strategic benefits by early 1863. It functioned as a supply base supporting the campaign against Vicksburg, offered a staging ground for any future push toward Little Rock, and helped secure the northeastern corner of the state. As Union forces tightened their grip on Vicksburg in late May, Confederate leadership reached out to General Joseph E. Johnston, proposing that troops from the Trans-Mississippi Department be redirected to ease that pressure. Among the options considered was a strike against Helena itself. Lieutenant General Edmund Kirby Smith, who led Confederate forces in the Trans-Mississippi region, received the forwarded dispatch in June and passed the final decision on whether to launch such an assault to Lieutenant General Theophilus Holmes, who commanded the District of Arkansas for the Confederacy.

Prelude

Holmes discovered on June 9 that Union numbers at Helena stood somewhere between 3,000 and 4,000 troops, a figure that led him to abandon any thought of an assault. In his judgment the price of striking the town outweighed the benefit, and he proposed instead setting up an artillery position along the Mississippi to harass Union river traffic. His hesitation persisted until word came from Confederate cavalry on June 14 that the Helena garrison had thinned out. This news pushed him to start moving toward Jacksonport, where on June 18 he linked up with Major General Sterling Price and Brigadier General John S. Marmaduke. Together the three officers settled on a strategy for massing Confederate strength against Helena, though Holmes remained uneasy, fearing the venture could collapse. He struck a bargain with Price, whose standing among the troops far exceeded his own, that Price would back him publicly should the operation go badly.

The finished plan directed Price to march his 3,095 foot soldiers from Jacksonport toward Cotton Plant on June 22, accompanied by Marmaduke's 1,750 horsemen. Meanwhile Brigadier General James F. Fagan was to bring 1,339 infantrymen from Little Rock to Clarendon, and Brigadier General Lucius M. Walker would use his 1,462 cavalry to screen the approach to Helena. Holmes himself intended to travel with the strike force. That same day, June 22, he altered the arrangement, telling Price to gather his men at a spot called Switzer's rather than Cotton Plant. Heavy rain and swollen streams slowed Price's progress considerably; Marmaduke's cavalry made it to Switzer's on schedule, but the infantry bogged down trying to cross the Cache River. Passing through swampy ground cost the column many draft animals and wagons. By June 26, Holmes and Fagan had arrived in Clarendon, where Holmes issued fresh instructions: Walker would use part of his force to shield Fagan's advance on Helena while Price pushed forward from Switzer's. The terrain and weather continued to hamper Price's march, frustrating Holmes, who correctly sensed that these delays had already cost the Confederates any hope of catching the enemy unaware. The scattered columns finally joined together on July 3, and that same day the combined force began its last push toward Helena. In total, Confederate strength numbered 7,646 men.

Command of the Union defenders at Helena fell to Major General Benjamin Prentiss, whose forces comprised the Thirteenth Division of the Thirteenth Corps. Though Prentiss held authority over the broader district surrounding Helena, actual control of the garrison rested with Brigadier General Frederick Salomon, who led the division and would end up making most of the tactical calls once fighting began. At first Prentiss brushed aside talk of a coming Confederate strike, but as June drew to a close he started taking such warnings more seriously. West of Helena stood an existing defensive work called Fort Curtis, and beyond this four additional batteries, labeled A, B, C, and D, were constructed, each positioned atop a rise along Crowley's Ridge. Timber was cut down in front of the Union positions, though whether these felled trees were left as simple barriers or fashioned into abatis remains uncertain. The Union Navy had originally planned to send three vessels to reinforce Prentiss, yet when Confederate forces finally attacked, only a single timberclad, the USS Tyler, had actually arrived. As a further safeguard, Prentiss called off festivities planned for the Fourth of July and had the approach roads blocked with felled trees. The garrison Prentiss commanded would meet the assault with 4,129 men. Mindful of how his troops had been caught off guard earlier at Shiloh, he ordered reveille sounded every day at 2 am. Between their fortifications, artillery batteries, and naval backing, Prentiss's men held distinct advantages over their opponents, while the Confederates could count on the support of local white civilians.

Battle

On the third of July, Confederate commanders Holmes, Price, Walker, Fagan, and Marmaduke met to work out how the assault would unfold. Holmes admitted the Helena fortifications looked tougher than he had anticipated, yet he chose to proceed regardless. The scheme called for Price to strike the Union center, with particular attention to Battery C atop Graveyard Hill. Fagan, positioned to the south, would target Battery D on Hindman's Hill. From the north, Marmaduke, backed by Walker, would push toward Rightor's Hill, seize it, and then turn it into an artillery platform capable of shelling Batteries A and B. Walker's instructions were notably imprecise, telling him only to respond to circumstances as he saw fit, and this vagueness left him largely idle once fighting began. Holmes vowed to shoulder the blame personally should the operation collapse. Coordinating such a multi-pronged assault proved difficult, and the various generals did not agree on what Holmes meant by attacking at "daylight." The historian Robert Kerby later characterized the Confederate scheme as reckless to the point of brutality. Because Prentiss already anticipated an assault, the rebels lost any element of surprise, and weak scouting further undercut their preparations.

Late on the third, Fagan dispatched a patrol under Colonel William H. Brooks to seize the point where two roads toward Little Rock intersected. Around 1:30 in the morning, Brooks moved his men up the Lower Little Rock Road to shield Fagan's flank, and this detachment triggered the fighting by skirmishing with Union pickets as dawn approached. Along the way, Brooks' soldiers came upon a camp housing African-American refugees; some were slain, others captured, and the camp itself was ultimately burned. Fallen trees blocking the Upper Little Rock Road slowed Fagan's principal advance and compelled his men to abandon their wagons and artillery. Sometime between 3:30 and just past 4:00 in the morning, a warning shot from Fort Curtis alerted Union defenders that the Confederates were approaching. By 4:05, Fagan's skirmishers spotted Union positions, and as daylight broke he sent three infantry regiments forward. His men overran the outer defensive line before coming under punishing fire from Batteries C and D. Shortly after Fagan's engagement began, Marmaduke's forces at the northern end of the line joined the fight, pushing Union skirmishers back toward Battery A. There they met fire from the 29th Iowa Infantry, sent to bolster the Rightor's Hill position, and Marmaduke's men, fighting on foot, fell into disorder. He halted them to await artillery support and Walker's arrival. Meanwhile Brooks, advancing along the Lower Little Rock Road, ran afoul of Battery K of the 1st Missouri Light Artillery and the gunboat Tyler; the land battery did little harm, but the vessel's fire proved far more damaging, scattering Brooks' command until it could regroup around 8:00 a.m.

Price's assault, meanwhile, lagged behind schedule. Navigating his troops through ravines and hills, he concluded he would have to leave his cannons behind, though select gunners went along with the infantry in hopes of manning any captured Union pieces. Terrain obstacles further scrambled his formations. Leading the advance was the 9th Missouri Sharpshooter Battalion, which spotted Union defenses atop Graveyard Hill. Even with daylight already visible, Price misread Holmes' timing instructions and held his men back until Holmes personally arrived to clarify the order. During this delay, Fagan's men pressed into the second Union defensive line. The 43rd Indiana Infantry, which bore the brunt of Fagan's attack, received reinforcement from elements of the 33rd Iowa and 35th Missouri regiments under Salomon's direction. Since Price had not yet moved, Fagan's soldiers absorbed fire from both Battery D and Battery C simultaneously. Nonetheless his troops broke through the second line, then the third, then a fourth, before their momentum finally gave out around 7:00 a.m. in front of Battery D.

Marmadu

Aftermath

Out of the 7,646 men Holmes brought into the fight, 1,636 became casualties: 173 dead, 687 wounded, and 776 missing. Prentiss asserted that his men had taken more than 1,100 Confederate prisoners and buried over 300 Confederate dead. The brigades of Fagan, Parsons, and Mc