Pea Ridge

Fought on March 7 and 8, 1862, near Leetown northeast of Fayetteville, Arkansas, this engagement is remembered under two names, Pea Ridge and Elkhorn Tavern, and unfolded as part of the wider conflict between the states. Brigadier General Samuel R. Curtis commanded the Federal troops that had pushed southward out of central Missouri, forcing the Confederates back into the northwestern corner of Arkansas. In response, Major General Earl Van Dorn organized a Confederate push aimed at retaking both Missouri and the northern portion of Arkansas. His troops converged at Bentonville, forming what became the largest Rebel army, in terms of both manpower and artillery, ever gathered west of the Mississippi. Despite facing steep odds, Curtis withstood the initial Confederate assault on day one, then turned the tables on day two by pushing Van Dorn's army from the field entirely. This Union victory secured Federal dominance over the greater part of Missouri and the northern reaches of Arkansas.

Background

By late 1861 and into the early months of 1862, Federal troops operating in Missouri had succeeded in driving Maj.-Gen. Sterling Price's Confederate Missouri State Guard out of the state entirely. Once spring arrived, Brig. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis, commanding the Union Army of the Southwest, resolved to chase the retreating Confederates across the border into Arkansas.

His campaign brought roughly 10,250 troops and fifty cannon into Benton County, Arkansas, settling along the banks of Little Sugar Creek. The bulk of these men hailed from Iowa, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, and Ohio, and more than half were German immigrants serving in the 1st and 2nd Divisions. Those divisions answered to Brig. Gen. Franz Sigel, himself a German immigrant who had anticipated leading the entire expedition into Arkansas. When Curtis instead received the top command, Sigel nearly quit in protest. To balance the army's ethnic makeup, commanders placed regiments composed mostly of native-born soldiers into the 3rd and 4th Divisions.

Price's forces withdrew swiftly down Wire Road into Arkansas, with Curtis's army following close on their heels. Skirmishing broke out between the opposing sides near Potts Hill and Little Sugar Creek even as Confederate reinforcements arrived to bolster Price's ranks against the pursuing Federals. As the combined Southern force pushed deeper into Arkansas, it stretched Curtis's supply lines thin. Facing this strain and lacking fresh troops to continue his advance, Curtis chose to halt and dig in. He established a strong defensive position north of the creek, arranging his artillery to meet an anticipated Confederate strike from the south. While Curtis held this ground, Confederate generals Price and Benjamin McCulloch abandoned Fayetteville and withdrew to establish camp within the Boston Mountains.

Meanwhile, Maj.-Gen. Earl Van Dorn had taken command of the entire Trans-Mississippi District, a move meant to ease growing friction between Price, representing Missouri, and McCulloch, representing Texas. Under Van Dorn's authority, the Army of the West numbered close to 16,000 men, encompassing 800 Indian troops, Price's Missouri State Guard units alongside other Missouri regiments, and McCulloch's mixed force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery drawn from Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Missouri.

Having learned of the Union advance into Arkansas, Van Dorn aimed to crush Curtis's army and reclaim the route back into Missouri. His strategy called for swinging around Curtis's position to strike from behind, leaving the Federals with no choice but to flee northward or face being trapped and destroyed. To move quickly, Van Dorn stripped his army down to bare essentials, allowing each soldier only three days of rations, forty rounds of ammunition, and a single blanket. Divisions could bring one ammunition wagon and an extra day's worth of food, but everything else, tents and cookware included, stayed behind.

Prelude

Rather than striking Curtis's line directly, Van Dorn chose on March 4, 1862, to divide his force into two divisions, one under Price and the other under McCulloch, sending them north along the Bentonville Detour so as to swing behind Curtis and sever his communications. To move quickly, he abandoned his supply trains, a choice that would matter greatly later. Battling a bitter winter storm, the Confederate columns pushed through a grueling three-day march from Fayetteville, passing Elm Springs and Osage Spring before reaching Bentonville, arriving exhausted, famished, and spread thin along the route.

Tipped off by scouts and local Arkansas unionists, Curtis moved quickly to draw his scattered forces together behind Little Sugar Creek. Among them was William Vandever's brigade of 700 men, who covered 42 miles in just 16 hours coming from Huntsville. Yet Curtis's right side was weakened when Sigel dispatched 360 men westward on a separate assignment, removing them from action for the following three days. Sigel further pulled a cavalry patrol off the very road the Confederates were using to approach, though Colonel Frederick Schaefer of the 2nd Missouri Infantry took it upon himself to stretch his patrols and cover the resulting gap. It was one of these patrols, encountered near Elm Springs, that gave the Federals warning when Van Dorn's advance guard stumbled into it. Even so, Sigel delayed so long in pulling out of Bentonville that Van Dorn nearly trapped his rear guard on March 6.

Sigel held his ground until the Confederates were almost upon him before ordering his 600 men and six cannon to retreat along a road running northeast toward Curtis. Meanwhile Elijah Gates led the Confederate 1st Missouri Cavalry in a strike from the south meant to sever Sigel's escape route. This assault caught and captured a company from the 36th Illinois by surprise, though many of these prisoners regained freedom when they collided unexpectedly with Sigel's retreating column. Sigel ultimately broke through Gates' men, aided considerably by an error committed by Confederate Brig. Gen. James M. McIntosh.

McIntosh's intention had been to swing around Sigel's force from the northwest as Gates sealed off the southern route, but he steered his 3,000 cavalry troopers too far along a road heading north. Realizing his error only after covering three unnecessary miles, he redirected his men eastward toward the Little Sugar Creek valley. By the time McIntosh's column reached the junction where his eastbound path crossed Sigel's northeastern route, Sigel's men had already slipped past, narrowly avoiding catastrophe. The 3rd Texas Cavalry then charged directly into Sigel's main line. In the clash, ten Confederates died and twenty or more fell wounded from Union artillery and rifle volleys, leaving the Federal position unbroken.

Curtis arranged his four modest divisions in a fortified line straddling the Telegraph Road, also called the Wire Road, atop the bluffs overlooking Little Sugar Creek. From that creek, the Wire Road ran northeast to Elkhorn Tavern, crossing paths there with the Huntsville Road heading east and Ford Road heading west. Beyond Elkhorn, the Wire Road pressed north through Cross Timber Hollow before crossing into Missouri, and from there the Federal supply route continued northeast toward St. Louis. Northwest of the Telegraph Road, roughly midway between the bluff position and Ford Road, sat the small settlement of Leetown. Curtis established his headquarters at Pratt's Store, situated along the Wire Road between Elkhorn Tavern and Little Sugar Creek.

Van Dorn aimed to reach the Federal rear by way of the Bentonville Detour, a route stretching from Camp Stephens, west of Curtis, northeast up onto the Pea Ridge plateau. Near Twelve Corner Church, a structure still standing today, Ford Road split off eastward toward Elkhorn, while the Detour pressed on northeast until it met the Wire Road just above Cross Timber Hollow. Hemmed between the Detour to the north, Cross Timber Hollow to the east, and Ford Road to the south stood Big Mountain, terrain too rugged for any army to cross.

On the night of March 6, with Curtis's blessing, Col. Grenville Dodge dispatched

Battle, March 7

Van Dorn's strategy called for both divisions to converge at Cross Timber Hollow, yet as daylight broke only the leading elements of Price's command had arrived. This holdup led Van Dorn to redirect McCulloch, ordering him to march his division along the Ford Road from Twelve Corner Church so the two forces could unite near Elkhorn.

Union scouts that morning picked up signs of both approaching columns. Uncertain where the bulk of the Confederate army actually stood, Curtis pushed Dodge's brigade, part of Col. Eugene A. Carr's 4th Division, northeast on the Wire Road to link with the 24th Missouri Infantry near Elkhorn Tavern. Dodge, however, remained anxious about a possible strike from behind and, ignoring his orders, withdrew his men to Pratt's Store instead, positioning them to rush to Elkhorn's defense if needed. Curtis simultaneously dispatched Col. Peter J. Osterhaus with a mixed detachment to scout northward on Ford Road. This group included Col. Nicholas Greusel's brigade from Osterhaus' own 1st Division, mounted troops under Col. Cyrus Bussey, and a dozen artillery pieces.

McCulloch commanded a cavalry brigade led by Brig. Gen. James McIntosh, foot soldiers under Col. Louis Hébert, and an allied mounted force of Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole warriors serving under Brig. Gen. Albert Pike. Turning west along Ford Road, McCulloch's men collided with Federal troops near the tiny settlement of Leetown, sparking intense combat.

Around 11:30 in the morning, Osterhaus pushed north through a stretch of woodland into Foster Farm and beheld a startling scene: McCulloch's whole division marching eastward on Ford Road just a few hundred yards distant. Though badly outmatched, he sent Bussey's small unit forward to buy time while his infantry organized. Three Union guns opened fire on the Confederates, killing no fewer than ten men. In response, McCulloch pivoted McIntosh's 3,000 mounted troops southward, and the resulting charge shattered Bussey's command, scattering his men and seizing the cannons. Nearby, two companies from the 3rd Iowa collided with Pike's Cherokee fighters and suffered a similar rout. The peculiar imbalance in Iowa's losses, 24 dead against only 17 wounded, hints that Native warriors dispatched some of the injured Federals where they lay. This episode permanently damaged Pike's standing, as evidence suggested that beyond finishing off wounded soldiers, some victims were also scalped or mutilated by the stunned Union troops' attackers.

Just south of that timber stood Oberson's Field, giving Greusel enough time to array his brigade and nine guns along its southern treeline. Sul Ross, seizing the moment, led the 6th Texas Cavalry after Bussey's retreating men, but upon entering the open field his troops were met with fire and fell back rapidly. Greusel then deployed two skirmishing companies from the 36th Illinois between Oberson's and Foster's fields along the timber's edge. Federal artillerymen began firing blind shells over the trees, and although aimed at nothing they could see, the bursts terrified the Cherokee fighters, who fled and proved impossible to reorganize. At the same time, McCulloch arranged Hébert's 4,000 infantrymen along a broad line and sent them southward, with Hébert overseeing four regiments east of the Leetown Road and McCulloch personally directing the four west of it.

McCulloch himself advanced into the timber to check on Union positions firsthand and was killed instantly, shot through the heart by Illinois skirmishers within range. Word of his death reached McIntosh only after delay, and out of fear that morale would collapse, his staff chose not to inform most subordinate commanders. Not consulting anyone, McIntosh rashly led his old unit, the dismounted 2nd Arkansas Mounted R

Battle, March 8

The night brought a sharp drop in temperature, leaving soldiers on both sides thoroughly chilled and miserable. Curtis summoned Davis and his 3rd Division to Ruddick's field under cover of darkness, and once Davis arrived he took a position in the line just left of Carr. Sigel, meanwhile, spent the night leading the 1st and 2nd Divisions on a winding, roundabout march before finally settling them into camp near Pratt's Store. Asboth, wounded during the day's final fighting, felt the Union position was untenable and urged Curtis more than once that night to withdraw. Even though his force had been severed from Missouri, Curtis dismissed any talk of retreat and voiced confidence that victory would come with daylight.

Under cover of night, several regiments and artillery batteries from McCulloch's Division, guided by Greer, made their way to Van Dorn by traveling the Bentonville Detour and passing through Cross Timber Hollow. Van Dorn had no idea that his supply train had been sent back to Camp Stephens by mistake the previous afternoon and evening. Come morning, this error would leave the Confederate reserve artillery ammunition completely unreachable.

At first light, Sigel dispatched Osterhaus to survey the open prairie west of Elkhorn. The colonel spotted a rise of ground that looked ideal for placing artillery and passed word of it back to Sigel. He also proposed that the 1st and 2nd Divisions simply push up the Telegraph Road and form beside Davis' left flank instead of repeating the previous night's meandering route. Sigel accepted the suggestion and set his wing moving accordingly. At roughly the same time, Davis had an Illinois battery fire several rounds into the woods facing his line, which drew a fierce response. Three Southern batteries answered with fire that forced two Federal batteries to fall back and made Davis pull his men from open ground into the trees. A Confederate probing attack followed but was beaten back without difficulty.

Before long, Sigel's troops stretched out in an extended line to Davis' left. By eight in the morning, Asboth's division held the far left flank, followed by Osterhaus, then Davis, then Carr, with the whole Federal line generally oriented northward. This may have been the sole occasion in the entire conflict when a complete army stood visibly arrayed in a single unbroken battle line from one end to the other. Sigel then concentrated twenty-one cannons atop the open rise west of Elkhorn. Taking direct command of the guns himself, he unleashed devastating fire on the twelve Southern pieces facing him. As the Confederate crews were forced to withdraw under this punishing barrage, Van Dorn sent forward two replacement batteries. One of them broke and fled in panic, prompting Van Dorn to have its commanding officer arrested. Still, nothing the Southern commander tried could match Sigel's crushing artillery superiority, and the Confederate guns answered with fire too weak to inflict serious Federal losses.

Having largely silenced the enemy's cannons, Sigel turned his gunners' attention to the Confederate infantry hidden in the woods. Near the foot of Big Mountain, the shells shattered rock and timber alike, sending deadly fragments flying and forcing the 2nd Missouri Brigade to abandon its ground. This stood as one of the rare instances in the war where an opening bombardment truly weakened an enemy line ahead of an infantry charge. While the guns pounded away, Sigel's foot soldiers crept steadily forward, and by half past nine his divisions had pivoted to the right and now faced northeast. It was around this point that Van Dorn discovered his reserve ammunition sat with the wagon train, some six hours distant. Realizing with bitterness that victory was beyond reach, the Southern commander chose to withdraw along the Huntsville Road, a route running east from the tavern before bending south. As Price, though wounded, held the rear guard, Van Dorn's men began shifting toward the Huntsville Road amid considerable disorder.

At half past ten, Sigel launched his two divisions forward in attack. On the extreme left

Aftermath

The tally of Union losses came to 1,384: 203 dead, 980 wounded, and 201 unaccounted for. Carr's 4th Division bore the brunt of this, with 682 casualties, most suffered during the opening day's fighting, while Davis' 3rd Division counted 344. Both division commanders, Asboth and Carr, sustained wounds themselves yet stayed at their posts leading their men.

On the Confederate side, Van Dorn put his own losses at 800 killed and wounded plus 200 to 300 taken prisoner, though these figures likely understate the true toll. Modern historians place Confederate casualties closer to 2,000. The officer corps was hit especially hard: McCulloch, McIntosh, and William Y. Slack either died outright or succumbed to their wounds, and Price himself was injured. Among the colonels, Hébert fell into enemy hands, Benjamin Rives died of wounds, two more colonels were captured, and another was hurt.

Cut off from their supply train, the bulk of Van Dorn's force spent a grueling week retreating through nearly empty countryside, scraping together whatever food they could take from local residents. They eventually linked back up with their supplies south of the Boston Mountains, though by then thousands of Price's men had already deserted for Missouri. Pike, convinced the Confederate army had been wiped out, headed back to the Indian Territory. Van Dorn himself would not concede defeat, insisting instead that he had "only failed in my intentions." The loss at Pea Ridge marked the end of any serious Confederate threat to Missouri, and within a matter of weeks Van Dorn's army crossed the Mississippi to reinforce the Confederate Army of Tennessee, leaving Arkansas essentially unguarded.

Buoyed by the win, Curtis dispatched a portion of his forces east across the Mississippi and led the rest eastward toward West Plains, Missouri, before pivoting south into an unprotected stretch of northeastern Arkansas. Though he entertained hopes of taking Little Rock, dwindling supplies and guerrilla raids on his supply lines made that goal unreachable. He instead tracked roughly along the White River southward, capturing Helena, Arkansas, on July 12.

Throughout the two days of combat, Curtis kept his nerve and managed his outnumbered army with a steady hand. Three of his four division leaders, Osterhaus, Davis, and Carr, gave him strong support, as did brigade commanders Dodge, Vandever, and Greusel. Sigel earned praise for his conduct on the morning of March 8, but his unpredictable conduct at other points, combined with his efforts to take personal credit for the win, drove a wedge between him and Curtis. Not long after, Sigel found himself reassigned to a post in Virginia.

Van Dorn, meanwhile, neglected supply concerns and lost his grip on the army as a whole. Once McCulloch fell, his division disintegrated even as Van Dorn buried himself in the minutiae of Price's portion of the fight. Communication between his staff and the wagon train broke down at a crucial moment, one of several serious blunders. In the aftermath, troops took to saying that nobody had truly lost the battle except Van Dorn himself. Among the Southern officers who fought that day, Henry Little stood out for his skill, effectively taking charge of Price's division by the battle's close.