New Hope Church was a Civil War engagement fought in Georgia, 1864. It was a Confederate victory.
After Johnston retreated to Allatoona Pass on May 19-20, Sherman decided that he would most likely pay dearly for attacking Johnston there, so he determined to move around Johnston's left flank and steal a march toward Dallas. Johnston anticipated Sherman's move and met the Union forces at New Hope Church. Sherman mistakenly surmised that Johnston had a token force and ordered Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker's corps to attack. This corps was severely mauled. On the 26th, both sides en-trenched, and skirmishing continued throughout the day. Actions the next day in this area are discussed under Pickett's Mills.
During the Atlanta Campaign of the American Civil War, Union forces commanded by Major General William T. Sherman met Confederate troops of the Army of Tennessee under General Joseph E. Johnston at New Hope Church, with fighting unfolding across May 25 and 26, 1864.
Sherman opened his offensive on May 7, 1864, fighting at Rocky Face Ridge, where he managed to swing around Johnston's flank on the western side. Days later, from May 13 through 15, the two armies clashed again at Resaca, a fight during which Polk's corps started reaching the
Sherman opened his offensive on May 7, 1864, fighting at Rocky Face Ridge, where he managed to swing around Johnston's flank on the western side. Days later, from May 13 through 15, the two armies clashed again at Resaca, a fight during which Polk's corps started reaching the
On the morning of May 25, Hardee's corps established itself at Dallas, sitting astride the road toward Marietta while Polk's corps guarded its right side. Further to the right, Hood's corps settled into position near New Hope Church, to the northeast of Dallas. Hindman's division held Hood's left, and Stevenson's division anchored the right, while Stewart's division occupied the middle ground, bolstered by a brigade drawn from Stevenson's command. Hood's men wasted no time digging rifle pits and stacking breastworks from logs and stones. Watching from Elsberry Mountain, Confederate lookouts spotted rising dust that signaled Sherman's approaching columns. Later that afternoon, Hood's men seized a Union prisoner who confessed to serving under Hooker.
That same day, McPherson's left wing pushed southeast along the road connecting Van Wert and Dallas, with Davis' division branching off eastward onto a side road. Meanwhile, Hooker's XX Corps advanced along the Burnt Hickory to Dallas road, Geary's division holding the main route while Williams moved on the right and Butterfield on the left through smaller lanes. The IV and XIV Corps trailed to Hooker's right, and Schofield's corps stayed near Burnt Hickory. Upon reaching Pumpkinvine Creek, Union forces discovered Confederates attempting to burn the bridge; Hooker's cavalry escort chased them off, allowing Geary's men to cross safely. Near Owen's Mills, where the road split, Geary's division veered toward New Hope Church. His advancing column soon met fierce resistance from the 32nd and 58th Alabama Infantry Regiments along with Austin's Sharpshooters, all under Colonel Bushrod Jones. To push through, Geary had to stretch Candy's brigade into a long skirmish line.
Prisoners captured by Geary's soldiers revealed that Hood's entire corps lay just ahead, news that startled both Thomas and Hooker since none of them, including Sherman, had anticipated serious resistance this early. Worried that Geary's exposed position invited a sudden assault, Thomas called forward Williams' and Butterfield's divisions to hurry to his aid. Williams, who had already marched down the right fork toward Dallas, was forced to backtrack to Owen's Mills before turning onto Geary's road. By late afternoon, between four and five o'clock, both divisions had joined Geary's line. Still believing only a small Confederate force held the area, Sherman instructed Thomas to press an attack, and Thomas relayed the order to Hooker.
Shortly past five, Hooker launched his assault, positioning Williams on the right, Butterfield on the left slightly behind to guard against flanking, and Geary in support. Each division formed in columns of brigades, with brigades arranged one behind another in line. All three pushed forward roughly a mile through thick woods and tangled brush, Hooker and Williams riding just behind the lead brigade. As the men reached low ground, a torrent of rifle and cannon fire erupted, sending them diving for whatever cover the terrain offered while they returned fire. Butterfield's and Geary's men soon dropped as well under the same barrage.
Facing them were roughly 4,000 Confederate defenders from Stewart's division, arranged with Stovall, Clayton, and Baker's brigades in the front line from left to right and Gibson's brigade held in reserve, all backed by sixteen cannons. Despite being outnumbered by some 16,000 Union troops, Stewart's fortified men held their ground without much difficulty.
The Federal commanders had hoped to catch their enemy exposed, but it soon became evident that log and earthen works shielded the Confederate line. The one clear target, a Confederate artillery battery, absorbed casualties from the Union fire. After Robinson's brigade in Williams' division exhausted its sixty rounds per soldier, Ruger's brigade stepped in to relieve them, while Knipe's brigade waited behind as the third line. Johnston, arriving at Hood's headquarters that afternoon, asked Stewart whether he required additional troops, to which Stewart answered that his own men would hold their ground. The fighting stretched on for three hours, the final hour accompanied by a thunderstorm whose noise and rain mixed with the sounds of combat. Hooker's losses came to 1,665 killed and wounded, and
Stewart earned praise from both Johnston and Hood for holding his ground so effectively, while across the lines Sherman stewed over having his plan derailed in a way he had not foreseen. His frustration settled on Hooker, whom he already disliked, and he blamed him unjustly for hesitating instead of driving forward at once with Geary's division. In Sherman's view, Hooker's decision to wait for the arrival of his remaining two divisions had given the Confederates precious time to dig in. Sherman still clung to the hope that only Hood's corps stood before him, though he was slowly starting to realize that Johnston's full army occupied his front. Meanwhile, the noise of the clash carried all the way to Atlanta, sparking brief alarm among the residents there.
As night fell, Union forces dug in, and scattered skirmishes persisted through May 26. That afternoon McPherson's wing, along with Davis' division, took control of Dallas and pushed a further two miles eastward to set up a new position. Thomas and Schofield brought their troops together near New Hope Church. Dense woods hid a mile-wide gap that separated Thomas's men from McPherson's, much as a similar break existed between Hardee's corps near Dallas and the combined forces of Hood and Polk at New Hope Church. To address his own vulnerability, Johnston pulled Cleburne's division away from Hardee and shifted it to bolster his right flank. Having failed to outflank the Confederates on their left, Sherman turned his attention to their right side instead, a decision that led directly to the clash at Pickett's Mill on May 27.
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