Glorieta Pass

Fighting broke out at Glorieta Pass over three days, from March 26 to 28, 1862, pitting Union troops against Confederate forces in the northern reaches of New Mexico Territory. Though it did not rank among the larger engagements of the New Mexico campaign, this clash proved decisive in halting Confederate ambitions to seize the territory and other western lands.

The site of the fighting lay within the Sangre de Cristo Mountains, at the mountain pass that lent the battle its name, in an area now part of Santa Fe County, New Mexico. Southern forces hoped to shatter Union control over the western regions along the foot of the Rocky Mountains, with an eye toward eventually dominating the mines, railroads, and cities that made the area so valuable. This push west stood as the farthest-reaching military campaign the Confederacy undertook during the war, and it marked the only genuine effort by the South to seize and hold land under Union control.

The opening shots came on March 26, when scouting parties from both sides collided, setting the stage for the larger engagement that unfolded two days later on March 28. Confederate troops managed to drive their Union opponents back through the pass, yet victory proved hollow once their supply train was wiped out and the bulk of their horses and mules were either slaughtered or scattered. This loss ultimately compelled the Southern force to abandon the campaign altogether, and by June the Union had reestablished complete authority over the territory.

Since the Confederacy made no further attempts to push into the region afterward, the fight at Glorieta Pass stands as the high point of the ambitious New Mexico campaign, securing its place as a pivotal moment in the state's Civil War story.

Battle

Before engagement began, Union troops marched hard from Denver, crossing Raton Pass on their way to Fort Union and continuing on to Glorieta Pass, a grueling trek of 400 miles (600 km) completed in just 14 days. They had barely arrived at the battlefield when fighting broke out, giving them almost no chance to rest.

At Apache Canyon, on one end of Glorieta Pass, Pyron settled his 300 troops into camp and posted 50 men as pickets near the summit. Chivington, commanding 418 soldiers, marched to the pass and launched his assault on the morning of March 26. By afternoon his troops had overrun the picket post and discovered the larger Confederate force positioned beyond it. He pushed forward but was driven back by artillery fire. Reorganizing, he divided his men to flank both sides of the canyon, catching the Texans in a crossfire that eventually forced their withdrawal. Pyron pulled back roughly 1.5 miles (2.4 km) to a tighter stretch of the pass and set up a defensive position before Chivington's troops caught up. Once again the Union men flanked and raked Pyron's line with enfilade fire. Pyron gave the order to fall back further, but pulling out the artillery threw his men into disarray, breaking them into isolated fighting groups. Seeing this, Chivington sent a mounted company from Colorado charging straight at the guns, a move that netted several prisoners and sent the rest scattering. Uncertain whether Confederate reinforcements lurked nearby, Chivington chose to withdraw and set up camp at Kozlowski's Ranch, where he awaited Slough's main force. Though modest, this victory lifted the spirits of Slough's army.

The following day passed without combat, as both sides used the lull to bring in reinforcements. Scurry's men reached the field at 3:00 am on March 27, boosting Confederate numbers to roughly 1,100 troops with five cannons; being the ranking officer, he assumed command over the whole Confederate force. Anticipating another Union assault and expecting Green's arrival behind Slough's position at any moment, Scurry opted to hold his ground that day and put his men to work digging rifle pits. Slough, meanwhile, showed up early on March 28 with about 900 additional troops, raising his total strength to 1,300.

Both commanders resolved to strike on March 28 and moved out early that morning. Believing the Confederates would stay put in Apache Canyon, Slough dispatched Chivington along with two infantry battalions under Lewis and Wynkoop on a flanking route, instructing them to conceal themselves at Glorieta Pass and strike the Texans' flank once the main Union force engaged from the front. Chivington carried out these instructions, positioning his men above the pass to wait for the clash below. But Scurry broke from Slough's expectations, pushing down the canyon faster than anticipated. He assumed the Union troops were pulling back toward Fort Union and planned to press the attack until Green's forces could join him. Leaving one cannon and a handful of guards behind at Johnson's Ranch, Scurry moved the bulk of his command, over 1,000 men strong, east along the Santa Fe Trail.

Discovering the Confederates so far advanced, Slough struck around 11:00 am, roughly half a mile (800 m) from Pigeon's Ranch. Lieutenant Colonel Samuel F. Tappan took charge of a provisional battalion made up of four companies from the 1st Colorado, backed by two artillery batteries, and arranged his men across the trail. The Confederates dismounted and stretched a line across the canyon, though the rough terrain caused some units to mix together. For half an hour Tappan held firm and gained ground, but by noon the Confederates' greater numbers allowed them to work around his flank. Union troops fell back in disorder, though they managed to regroup near the adobe buildings of the ranch. Slough then reorganized his men several hundred yards nearer to Pigeon's Ranch: Tappan's four companies and one battery took a hill on the left, another battery with two supporting companies held the center along the road, and two remaining companies occupied the ridge on the right.

Scurry answered with an assault on three fronts. He sent Pyron and Raguet against the Union right, Sh

Controversy

Not everyone in New Mexico accepted that Chivington deserved credit for the fight at Johnson's Ranch. In Santa Fe, much of the praise instead went to James L. Collins, an official with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, who was said to have first proposed the indirect strike on the supply train. Critics also claimed he had nearly let the chance pass him by. The New Mexico Territorial Legislature, on January 23, 1864, passed a resolution that left Chivington's name out entirely, urging President Lincoln instead to promote two regular army men, William H. Lewis and Asa B. Carey, for what it called their distinguished conduct during the engagement. Weeks later, on March 8, Albuquerque's Rio Abajo Press took aim at the colonel, mocking what it described as his strutting around in glory borrowed from Captain Lewis, making no mention of Carey at all. The paper's editor claimed that the idea for the assault had come from someone else in the group, and that Chivington had only gone along with it after two hours of persuading. It further insisted that Lewis had actually directed the charge while Chivington merely watched the action unfold from a distance.

A weightier accusation held that Chivington's delay cost the Federals dearly. Had he moved his four hundred men to reinforce Slough the moment he heard fighting break out near Pigeon's Ranch, that force might have tipped the battle in the Union's favor, particularly if he had struck Scurry's flank as his orders required.

Aftermath

Glorieta Pass mattered in the larger scheme of the war, even if calling it "the Gettysburg of the West" stretches its true significance well beyond what actually happened there; as some historians have noted, such a label suits fiction writers more than it does serious students of history. The Confederates held the ground when the fighting ended, yet the loss of their supply train left them with no choice but to pull back toward Santa Fe, and they would ultimately give up New Mexico Territory altogether. Sibley's larger ambition, seizing the federal stronghold at Fort Union, never came to pass because of what happened at Glorieta. This setback likely pushed Union troops to withdraw beyond Raton Pass into Colorado Territory.

Regardless of how the battle unfolded, establishing a lasting Confederate foothold in the Southwest was never really feasible. The region simply lacked the resources needed to sustain Confederate forces over an extended occupation. On top of that, the eastward march of the Federal "California Column" through New Mexico Territory in the summer of 1862 stood poised to threaten any Confederate hold on the area.