Cedar Mountain

On August 9, 1862, fighting erupted near Culpeper County, Virginia, in an engagement known as either Cedar Mountain, Slaughter's Mountain, or Cedar Run, one of the many clashes of the American Civil War. Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks led Union troops in an assault against Confederate forces commanded by Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, who were pushing toward Culpeper Court House in an effort to block a Union move into central Virginia. Confederate lines nearly collapsed as the fighting began, but a counterattack later turned the tide, shattering the Union position and securing victory for Jackson's men. This clash marked the opening combat of the Northern Virginia campaign.

Background

On June 26, command of the freshly organized Union Army of Virginia fell to Maj. Gen. John Pope. He spread his forces in a curved line stretching across the northern part of the state. Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel held the right side of this formation near Sperryville, up against the Blue Ridge Mountains, while Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks anchored the middle at Little Washington. The left end, commanded by Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell, sat at Falmouth along the Rappahannock River. A portion of Banks's command, consisting of Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford's brigade along with Brig. Gen. John P. Hatch's horsemen, held a forward position at Culpeper Court House, some 20 miles (32 km) ahead of the main line.

Lee answered these troop placements by sending Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson and 14,000 troops toward Gordonsville on July 13. Two weeks later, on July 27, Jackson gained an additional 10,000 soldiers when Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill's division joined him. Lee's aim was for Jackson to hit Pope's army before it could be bolstered by the Army of the Potomac. For his part, Pope began moving his men south into Culpeper County on August 6, hoping to seize the rail junction at Gordonsville and simultaneously pull Confederate eyes away from Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's departure from the Virginia Peninsula.

Facing this danger, Jackson decided to strike first, targeting Banks's forward troops before Pope could gather his whole army near Gordonsville. Should Banks fall, Jackson planned to push on toward Culpeper Court House, the hub of the Union's arc across the region and located 26 miles (42 km) to the north, so as to prevent Pope's separate wings from linking up. Splitting the Union corps this way would let Jackson confront and beat them individually, echoing his tactics from the Valley Campaign. With this in mind, he began marching toward Culpeper on August 7, intending once again to outmaneuver his opponents and achieve local superiority in numbers just as he had done that spring in the Shenandoah. Ahead of the main force, cavalry under Brig. Gen. Beverly Robertson moved to clear away Union horsemen guarding the Rapidan River crossings and holding Madison Court House, since their presence threatened the Confederate left as the army pushed north. Robertson completed this mission without much trouble on August 8.

Progress toward Culpeper Court House proved slow, hampered both by a brutal heat wave gripping Virginia early that month and by Jackson's habitual secrecy, which left his division commanders uncertain of the intended route. Consequently, his lead troops had advanced merely 8 miles (13 km) by the close of August 8. Although Robertson had scattered the Union cavalry with ease, those troopers hurried back to inform Pope of the approaching Confederates. Pope reacted by directing Sigel to march to Culpeper Court House in support of Banks, while instructing Banks to hold a defensive position along a ridge above Cedar Run, situated 7 miles (11 km) south of the town.

Banks, still stinging from his earlier defeat at Jackson's hands in the Valley, craved a chance to even the score. Rather than waiting in a defensive posture to allow the rest of the army time to arrive, he chose to seize the initiative, planning to assault Jackson before his lines were fully set, even though the odds against him stood at two to one.

Aftermath

The engagement exacted a heavy toll on both sides. Union forces suffered 2,353 casualties, broken down into 314 dead, 1,445 wounded, and 594 missing, while Confederate losses totaled 1,338, with 231 killed and 1,107 wounded. Crawford's brigade was gutted, losing more than half its men along with the majority of its officers, and the brigades under Prince and Geary each saw casualty rates between 30 and 40 percent. Prince and Geary were both wounded, and Prince fell into enemy hands as a prisoner. Brig. Gen. Winder died from wounds inflicted by an artillery shell.

This engagement marked Clara Barton's introduction to work directly on a battlefield. She had already been nursing soldiers in Washington, D.C., and had tended the wounded following First Bull Run, but it was not until August 3, 1862, that the Department of the Army granted her permission to work at the front. Arriving on August 13, she spent the following two days and nights caring for injured men on the field, tending to Confederate prisoners as well as Union soldiers.

South of Cedar Run, on the mountain's western face, Jackson held his ground for two days, anticipating a Federal assault that never materialized. Concerned about the damage Jackson might inflict if left unchecked, Union commander Henry Halleck ordered Pope to stop advancing toward Gordonsville, effectively ceding the initiative to Lee. This shift put Pope on the defensive and opened the door for Lee to strike more freely. Once word reached Jackson that Pope's entire army had gathered at Culpeper Court House, he withdrew on August 12 to Gordonsville, taking up a defensive line behind the Rapidan River. The clash marked a turning point that moved the Virginia campaign away from the Peninsula and into the northern part of the state.

Poor weather conditions combined with breakdowns in communication among his division commanders cost Jackson his early advantage. He had anticipated facing the same hesitant adversary he had encountered in the valley, and the unexpected resistance nearly pushed his forces off the field entirely. Only strong leadership from Confederate officers at a pivotal juncture, along with Hill's timely arrival, prevented a rout, ultimately allowing superior numbers to push the Union troops back. Banks, still smarting from his earlier defeats at Jackson's hands in the valley, was eager to redeem himself. Facing a two to one disadvantage in numbers, he chose not to wait defensively for Pope's reinforcements but instead launched an aggressive strike, hoping