Deep Bottom II

Fought from August 14 to 20, 1864, near Deep Bottom in Henrico County, Virginia, this engagement formed part of the Richmond-Petersburg Campaign, also called the Siege of Petersburg, during the American Civil War. It carries several alternate names, including Fussell's Mill, a label especially common in the South, along with New Market Road, Bailey's Creek, Charles City Road, and White's Tavern.

On the night of August 13 into August 14, Major General Winfield Scott Hancock led troops across the James River from the south at Deep Bottom. Their goal was to menace Richmond and pull Confederate strength away from both the trenches at Petersburg, Virginia, and the Shenandoah Valley.

As August 14 unfolded, the X Corps pushed toward New Market Heights, while the II Corps stretched the Union position rightward along Bailey's Creek. Once darkness fell, command shifted the X Corps over to the right end of the Federal line, positioning it near Fussell's Mill and Charles City Road. Two days later, on August 16, Union troops launched attacks close to the mill that gained ground at first, only to be pushed back when Confederate forces counterattacked.

Several more days brought inconclusive clashes between the two sides. Finally, on the night of August 20, Federal forces withdrew back across to the James River's southern side. Although the Confederates succeeded in repelling the Union advance, doing so forced them to spread their troops thin, an outcome that ultimately served Union purposes.

Background

Locals used the term Deep Bottom for a stretch of the James River in Henrico County, sitting eleven miles southeast of Richmond, Virginia, on the northern side where the water curved into a horseshoe shape at Jones Neck. The name came from how deep the riverbed ran at that spot, and the location offered a handy crossing from the Bermuda Hundred sector on the opposite bank.

After failed assaults against Confederate positions from June 15 through 18, 1864, Lt. General Ulysses S. Grant settled into besieging Petersburg, Virginia. Union horsemen launched the Wilson-Kautz Raid between June 22 and July 1, hoping to sever the rail lines feeding into the city, and during this window Grant and his commanders drew up plans for another push against the Petersburg works.

That effort took shape as the First Battle of Deep Bottom, fought July 27 through 29, when Grant dispatched Maj. Gens. Winfield S. Hancock and Philip H. Sheridan toward Richmond and its rail connections, hoping to draw Confederate forces away from Petersburg. Union foot soldiers and cavalry could not force their way past Confederate defenses positioned at Bailey's Creek and Fussell's Mill, so the expedition pulled back, though it succeeded in briefly thinning Confederate numbers at Petersburg. This cleared the way for the assault already scheduled for July 30, which turned into the Battle of the Crater, a humiliating setback for Union forces caused by poor handling of resources among Grant's subordinates and paid for with heavy losses.

That same day, as the Crater disaster unfolded, Confederate Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early set fire to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, operating out of the Shenandoah Valley and menacing towns across Maryland and Pennsylvania along with the capital itself. This worried Gen. Robert E. Lee, who feared what countermeasures Grant might launch against Early. During the opening week of August, Grant placed Sheridan in charge of a newly unified Army of the Shenandoah, numbering close to 40,000 troops, tasked with confronting Early.

In response, Lee dispatched Maj. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw's infantry division, drawn from Lt. Gen. Richard H. Anderson's corps, together with the cavalry division under Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee, to Culpeper, Virginia, positioning them to either assist Early or return to the Richmond-Petersburg front if circumstances demanded. Grant read this movement incorrectly, believing that Anderson's whole corps had pulled out of the Richmond area and left barely 8,500 defenders north of the James River. This conviction pushed him to attempt another thrust at the Confederate capital, a move meant either to keep reinforcements from reaching Early or to once more stretch thin the defenders around Petersburg.

Command of the operation again fell to Hancock. On August 13, the X Corps under Maj. Gen. David B. Birney, along with Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg's cavalry division and the artillery belonging to Hancock's II Corps, moved across pontoon bridges running from Bermuda Hundred northward to Deep Bottom. At the same time, the rest of the II Corps staged a deception designed to convince Confederate observers that Hancock's force was heading north to bolster Sheridan.

The soldiers endured a punishing march in brutal heat toward City Point, with several men collapsing from heat exhaustion along the way, before boarding vessels bound for the Chesapeake Bay. Most of the rank and file had no idea where they were actually headed. A tugboat caught up with the convoy carrying revised orders, prompting the transports to reverse course and unload the II Corps at Deep Bottom on the night of August 13 into 14. The disembarkation proved disorganized and ran late, since Grant's staff had failed to secure wharves capable of accommodating the deep-draft steamships.

Battle

Once every Union soldier had crossed the James on August 14, Hancock arranged his force with Birney's X Corps holding the left, Mott's 3rd Division of II Corps stationed in the middle, and the 1st and 2nd Divisions, under Barlow (filling in while Gibbon was away), positioned on the right. Birney received orders to make a show of force against New Market Heights while the II Corps divisions worked to turn the Confederate left flank. Mott's assignment was to advance along the New Market Road toward Richmond, Barlow was to strike Fussell's Mill on the Darbytown Road, and Gregg's cavalry would guard the army's right flank while watching for any chance to dash into Richmond itself. Birney's men managed to brush aside pickets along Kingsland Road, yet the fortified positions at New Market Heights halted their progress. Meanwhile the II Corps divisions crept into place at a crawl, losing numerous men to heat stroke along the way.

Barlow's soldiers did not actually engage the Confederates until midday, discovering them entrenched in rifle pits along the Darbytown Road just above the Long Bridge Road. Federal commanders were caught off guard by the size of the opposing force. A complete Confederate division under Field held firm across from Birney and Mott, while Wilcox commanded another division defending Chaffin's Bluff, with additional troops on the way. Barlow's sluggish advance through the heat gave the Confederates precious time to bolster their position at Fussell's Mill, bringing in a section of howitzers along with Anderson's Georgia brigade. Hancock had envisioned Barlow's assault as the main thrust and told him to concentrate his forces along the Darbytown Road, but Barlow instead stretched his line so wide it touched Mott's right flank. This overextension, combined with dense woods slowing the advance, meant that only a single brigade out of Barlow's 10,000 men actually struck at Fussell's Mill. That brigade pushed back two Confederate cavalry regiments from Gary's brigade near the mill, though Anderson's brigade managed to repel the attack. However, when Field pulled Anderson's brigade from his right flank to help, it left a weaker line facing Birney, allowing his corps to advance, seize part of the Confederate trenches, and capture four cannon.

Despite the largely unsuccessful nature of the Union assaults, they achieved part of what Grant had hoped for. Lee grew convinced that Richmond faced genuine danger and started shifting troops toward the front, sending two infantry brigades from Mahone's division along with the cavalry divisions of Hampton and Rooney Lee. Grant directed Hancock to renew the offensive on August 15, and Hancock chose to keep pressing the Confederate left. Birney's corps was ordered to march through the night to link up with Barlow's flank. Rain fell that night, but the heat remained brutal, causing more than a third of Birney's men to drop out along the way.

Rough terrain slowed Birney's advance through most of August 15, forcing Hancock to scrap his plan for a dawn assault. Birney's men did not arrive at Fussell's Mill until about 1 p.m., and he spent the rest of the afternoon scouting the ground while his exhausted troops rested. By the time this was finished, Birney decided the hour was too late to launch an attack.

At dawn on August 16, Gregg led his cavalry east toward Glendale before turning northwest along the Charles City Road in the direction of Richmond. There they ran into Rooney Lee's cavalry blocking their path, sparking a battle that lasted the entire day. Union horsemen managed to push the Confederates back to White's Tavern before being forced to retreat to Fisher's Farm. Confederate general Chambliss lost his life in the fighting.

The X Corps infantry enjoyed early success that day when Terry's division, spearheaded by Pond's brigade, broke through the Confederate defenses. The unit commanded by the newly promoted Girardey, formerly Wright's Brigade, took heavy losses and fell back, tearing open a large gap in the line. Girardey himself died from a gunshot to the head while holding aloft the flag of the 64th Georgia. Field would later remark that not just the day but Richmond itself seemed lost. Dense woods, however, kept Birney and Hancock from realizing they held the upper hand, and Field managed to reorganize his lines and close the breach before the Federals could capitalize on it. Oates, leading two Alabama

Aftermath

The fighting cost the Union roughly 2,900 men, with heat stroke accounting for part of that toll, while Confederate losses stood at 1,500. Brig. Gen. John R. Chambliss fell in the engagement, and General Gregg, who had studied alongside him at West Point, arranged for his remains to be handled with care, eventually passing the body through the lines so that Chambliss's widow could receive it. She laid her husband to rest in the Chambliss Family Cemetery at Emporia, Virginia.

Much as had happened during the First Battle of Deep Bottom, the Union effort here could not overcome a defending force that, despite being outnumbered, held its ground. Yet the campaign still yielded a strategic benefit: Lee found himself forced to pull troops away from Petersburg and Bermuda Hundred to counter the Federal push, a diversion that also kept him from sending reinforcements to Early in the Shenandoah Valley.