Jerusalem Plank Road

Fought from June 21 to 23, 1864, near Petersburg, Virginia, the clash sometimes called the First Battle of the Weldon Railroad went by another name as well: Jerusalem Plank Road. This engagement opened a string of confrontations tied to the Siege of Petersburg, all designed to push Union siege lines farther west and choke off the rail supply routes feeding the city. During the fighting, a pair of infantry corps from the Army of the Potomac tried to break the Weldon Railroad, only to be struck and pushed back by the Confederates' Third Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, with Brig. Gen. William Mahone's division bearing much of the responsibility for that success. Although the railroad stayed in Southern hands for the time being, the Union response was to widen its earthworks toward the west, a move that steadily tightened the noose around Petersburg.

Background

The failed attempts to storm Petersburg in the days before left Grant with little choice but to settle in for a siege, facing off against Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, which held the city. Meade's Army of the Potomac dug in along the eastern approaches, stretching from a point near the Jerusalem Plank Road (known today as U.S. Route 301, or Crater Road) down to the Appomattox River, though Grant kept a close eye on Meade's decisions throughout.

Securing the rail connections that kept Petersburg and Richmond supplied became Grant's foremost priority. Three lines remained open: the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad, the South Side Railroad running west to Lynchburg, and the Petersburg Railroad (known alternatively as the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad), which stretched south to Weldon, North Carolina, linking there with the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad that fed into Wilmington, the Confederacy's last major functioning port. To strike at the South Side and Weldon lines, Grant planned an extensive mounted operation, which became known as the Wilson-Kautz Raid. Beyond this, he ordered a substantial body of infantry to move against the Weldon line nearer his own position. Meade assigned this task to the II Corps, under the temporary leadership of Birney since Hancock remained sidelined by the wound he had carried since Gettysburg, along with the VI Corps under Wright. To cover the gaps these two corps would leave in the trenches, troops from the Army of the James were brought over from Bermuda Hundred.

On June 21, while Union forces shifted their lines to get ready for the operation against the railroad, an unexpected guest arrived: President Lincoln, who had come by water and disembarked at City Point, where Grant had just set up his headquarters. Lincoln remarked to Grant that he had simply decided to board a boat and come see him, adding that he doubted he could be of much use and worried he might even get in the way, but that he would place himself under Grant's command and expected to be sent off at once if he caused any trouble. Following their conversation about strategy, Lincoln went on to visit some of the VI Corps soldiers who would soon take part in the coming fight.

Battle

On the 21st of June, portions of the II Corps pushed toward the railroad, trading fire with Confederate horsemen. The Union command hoped to send both the II and VI Corps across the Jerusalem Plank Road, then swing them northwest for roughly two miles until they struck the rail line. Swampy ground and dense thickets, however, dragged the columns down, and by the following morning a gap had opened between the two corps. The II Corps carried out its planned turn, but the VI Corps ran into Confederate soldiers from Cadmus Wilcox's division, part of A. P. Hill's corps, and chose to dig in rather than push forward. William Mahone, who commanded another division under Hill, noticed the widening space between the Federal corps and recognized it as an opportunity ripe for exploitation.

Before the war Mahone had worked as a railroad engineer and had once mapped this very stretch of ground below Petersburg. That background gave him knowledge of a ravine that could conceal Confederate soldiers as they moved into position for a strike. Lee gave his blessing to the scheme, and at three in the afternoon on June 22, Mahone's troops burst out behind the II Corps division led by Francis C. Barlow, catching the Federals completely off guard. One soldier later described it this way: the attack felt like far more than a surprise to the Union men, it was nothing short of an astonishment.

Barlow's division fell apart almost immediately once the assault hit. John Gibbon's division, despite having built defensive works, was likewise caught unprepared by the rear attack, and many of its regiments broke and fled. Mahone dispatched word to Wilcox urging him to join the fight, but Wilcox hesitated, wary of the VI Corps troops facing him, and the pair of regiments he eventually sent arrived too late to matter. Meanwhile the II Corps soldiers regrouped behind the earthworks they had thrown up on the night of the 21st, and their line held firm. Nightfall brought the fighting to a close.

The next day, June 23, the II Corps pushed forward again to reclaim the ground it had lost, only to discover the Confederates had already withdrawn and abandoned the captured works. Following instructions from Meade, the VI Corps pushed out a strong skirmish line after ten in the morning, making a fresh attempt to reach the Weldon Railroad. Soldiers from Lewis A. Grant's 1st Vermont Brigade managed to start ripping up the tracks before a larger Confederate infantry force fell upon them. A number of the Vermont men were captured, and the Federals had wrecked only about half a mile of rail before being driven off. Throughout the encounter, Meade pressed Horatio G. Wright again and again to advance and confront the enemy, yet Wright held back, fearing his corps might meet the same fate that had befallen the II Corps the day before. By 7:35 that evening, Meade's patience ran out, and he told Wright plainly, "Your delay has been fatal." Theodore Lyman, serving as Meade's aide, later remarked that Wright had proven himself entirely unsuited to lead a corps on that occasion.

Aftermath

The toll from the fighting fell heavily on the Union side, which lost 2,962 men, while Confederate losses numbered 572. Neither army could claim a decisive win, since each came away with something gained. Petersburg Railroad remained in Confederate hands, a point in their favor. Federal troops managed to tear up a brief stretch of track before being forced back, yet the more significant result lay elsewhere: the siege lines had been pushed farther west, a pattern Grant kept expanding until the spring of 1865 arrived.

Additional stretches of the Petersburg Railroad fell victim to destruction during the Wilson-Kautz Raid, and further sections would be lost to Union forces that August at the Battle of Globe Tavern, also called the Second Battle of the Weldon Railroad. Even so, Lee found a workaround, moving supplies by wagon from the Weldon line at the point where it met Stony Creek Station. Then, between December 7 and 11, Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren led an expedition that wrecked another 16 miles (26 km) of rail, leaving the Weldon Railroad useless for supplying Petersburg.