Petersburg

Fighting around Petersburg, Virginia stretched from June 9, 1864, through March 25, 1865, forming what historians call the Richmond-Petersburg campaign of the American Civil War. People often refer to it as the siege of Petersburg, yet this label misleads somewhat: the city was never fully surrounded by fortifications cutting off every path in or out, and the fighting spread well beyond Petersburg itself.

For nine months, soldiers dug in and fought from trenches. Grant's Union troops first tried and failed to take Petersburg by direct assault, then began building earthworks that would stretch past 30 miles (48 km), running from Richmond's eastern edge down to the eastern and southern approaches of Petersburg. Holding Petersburg mattered enormously because it kept supplies flowing to Lee's Confederate army and to Richmond, the Confederate capital. Both sides launched raids and clashed repeatedly as Union forces tried to sever the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad, and each new engagement tended to stretch the trench network even further.

By April 1865 the pressure proved too much, and Lee pulled his forces out of both cities, a retreat that ended in surrender at Appomattox Court House. Beyond its outcome, this drawn-out struggle anticipated the entrenched combat that would define World War I a half-century later, giving it lasting significance in military history. The campaign also brought together the largest number of African-American soldiers seen in the war, men who paid a heavy price in blood at places like the Battle of the Crater and Chaffin's Farm.

Background

By the spring of 1864, Ulysses S. Grant had risen to the rank of lieutenant general and taken overall command of Union forces. He crafted a plan to squeeze the Confederacy from several directions at once, the kind of unified pressure Lincoln had wanted his commanders to apply since the conflict began. Sherman took charge of all Union troops in the western theater, while Grant relocated his headquarters to travel alongside Meade's Army of the Potomac in Virginia. There, Grant hoped to force Lee into a conclusive engagement. Seizing Richmond, the Confederate capital, was a secondary goal, one Grant assumed would follow naturally if Lee's army could be broken.

Under this broader plan, Grant and Meade would press Lee from the north. Butler was tasked with advancing on Richmond from the southeast, Sigel with securing the Shenandoah Valley, and Sherman with pushing into Georgia to defeat Johnston and take Atlanta. Crook and Averell, both brigadier generals, were sent to disrupt rail lines supplying Confederate forces in West Virginia, and Banks was ordered to seize Mobile, Alabama.

Many of these efforts collapsed, partly because some commanders had been placed in their roles for political reasons rather than military skill. Butler's Army of the James stalled short of Richmond during the Bermuda Hundred Campaign, held back by a smaller Confederate force under Beauregard. Sigel suffered a decisive loss at New Market in May and was soon replaced by Hunter. Banks, meanwhile, became sidetracked by the Red River Campaign and never advanced on Mobile. Still, Crook and Averell succeeded in severing the final rail connection between Virginia and Tennessee, and Sherman's push toward Atlanta ultimately succeeded, even though it stretched on well into autumn.

On May 4, Grant and Meade led the Army of the Potomac across the Rapidan River into the densely wooded region known as the Wilderness, marking the start of what would become a six week campaign. The fighting that followed at the Wilderness, from May 5 to 7, and then at Spotsylvania Court House, from May 8 to 21, proved costly for both sides without producing a clear winner. Yet Grant broke from the pattern of earlier Union commanders by refusing to pull back afterward. Instead, he shifted his forces repeatedly toward the southeast, keeping Lee pinned on the defensive while edging steadily nearer to Richmond. Through the rest of May, Grant kept probing for an opening, hoping to draw Lee's army into open ground where the North's greater manpower could wear it down over time.

That strategy of attrition faced its harshest trial at Cold Harbor between May 31 and June 12, when the two armies clashed again near Mechanicsville. Grant opted for a direct assault, ordering his men forward against entrenched Confederate lines on June 3. The attack failed badly, with devastating losses on the Union side. Of all his battles, Cold Harbor left Grant with the deepest regret, and newspapers in the North began branding him "the Butcher" afterward. Even so, while Grant's casualties across the campaign reached roughly 50,000, about 41 percent of his force, Lee's proportional losses were worse still: around 32,000 men, or 46 percent, casualties the Confederacy had no way to replace.

On the night of June 12, Grant shifted his army leftward once more, this time marching toward the James River. His aim was to cross to the southern bank, sidestep Richmond entirely, and cut it off by capturing the rail hub at Petersburg. Lee, still unaware of what Grant intended, watched as Union engineers built a pontoon bridge stretching 2,100 feet, roughly 640 meters, across which the army crossed the James between June 14 and 18. The very outcome Lee dreaded most, being trapped into defending Richmond under siege, now loomed close.

Petersburg itself was a thriving city of about 18,000 residents and a vital supply hub for Richmond. Its location just south of the capital, its access to the James River via the Appomattox, and its position as a junction for five railroads made it indispensable. Because Petersburg served as the primary depot and transportation center for

Role of African Americans

During the siege at Petersburg that began in June 1864, enslaved Black laborers dug trenches and performed other physical labor for the Confederate cause, even as free Black men took up arms for the Union within the United States Colored Troops serving under the Army of the Potomac.

Virginia entered the war with roughly 549,000 Black residents, meaning one out of every six Black people living within the Confederacy called Virginia home. Nearly 89% of this population remained enslaved. Petersburg itself stood apart demographically: about half its residents were Black, and close to 35% of them were free, giving the city the distinction of holding more free Black residents than any other Southern city of its era. A good number of these freedmen built successful lives as barbers, blacksmiths, boatmen, draymen, livery stable operators, and caterers.

As Petersburg grew into a vital supply hub feeding the Confederacy and the nearby capital at Richmond, both free and enslaved Black workers took on numerous roles tied to the war effort, including labor for the many rail lines running through the city. Captain Charles Dimmock relied on this combined workforce in 1862 to build a ten-mile network of trenches and gun batteries encircling Petersburg for defense.

Black labor did not cease once the siege commenced that June. By September, Lee requested another 2,000 Black workers to bolster his labor force. That January 11, 1865, Lee sent a letter to the Confederate Congress pressing lawmakers to approve legislation that would allow enslaved men to be armed and enlisted in return for freedom. Congress responded on March 13 by passing a law authorizing the formation of Black military companies, and Davis translated this into official policy through General Order No. 14, issued March 23. Freedom under this plan remained conditional, however, since it depended entirely on a master's consent; no enslaved man could be recruited without agreeing himself and without his owner signing a written document granting him, so far as possible, the standing of a freedman.

Close to 187,000 Black men served the Union over the course of the war, and nowhere were United States Colored Troops massed more heavily than at Petersburg. When the Union launched its first assault on the city on June 15, a USCT division attached to the XVIII Corps played a key role in seizing and holding part of the Dimmock line. A second USCT division, attached to the IX Corps, later saw combat at the Battle of the Crater on July 30.

By December, the various USCT units stationed around Petersburg had been reorganized into three divisions, forming the XXV Corps within the Army of the James. This corps represented the largest concentration of Black troops gathered during the entire conflict, with numbers fluctuating between 9,000 and 16,000 soldiers. Across the Petersburg Campaign as a whole, these troops fought in six major engagements and were awarded 15 of the 25 Medals of Honor given to Black soldiers throughout the Civil War.

Black workers also filled a range of roles at the Union's supply depot at City Point, standing picket duty, laboring on the railroads, and handling tasks such as unloading vessels, moving earth, cutting timber, and driving piles. A number of them additionally served as cooks at the Depot Field Hospital.

Initial attempts to capture Petersburg

After the standoff at Cold Harbor, Benjamin Butler learned that Confederate forces had been shifting northward to bolster Lee's army, which left Petersburg's defenses thin. Still stinging from his poor showing during the Bermuda Hundred campaign, Butler hoped a victory here might restore his reputation as a commander. In his own words, taking Petersburg "lay near my heart."

The city sat behind several rings of fortifications. The outer ring, called the Dimmock line, ran ten miles east of Petersburg and consisted of earthworks and trenches holding 55 artillery batteries, with its ends resting on the river. Only 2,500 Confederate troops, spread thinly across this line, defended the position under Brigadier General Henry A. Wise, once governor of Virginia. The terrain around the city, marked by rolling hills and low ground, meant that despite the extensive fortifications, cavalry could slip through unnoticed at several points before reaching the city's inner works.

By the afternoon of June 8, Butler had drawn up a plan involving three columns totaling 4,500 men, all set to cross the Appomattox River. Two of these columns were infantry, Gillmore's X Corps troops and Hinks's USCT division from the XVIII Corps, tasked with striking the Dimmock line east of Petersburg. The third column, 1,300 troopers under Kautz, would circle around and hit the city from the southeast. The advance began the night of June 8 but moved sluggishly. The infantry finally got across by 3:40 in the morning on June 9, and within hours, by 7 a.m., both Gillmore and Hinks had made contact with Confederate forces but halted rather than pressing forward. Gillmore informed Hinks he intended to attack, yet insisted both infantry units wait for Kautz's cavalry to strike from the south first.

Kautz's troopers, slowed by frequent skirmishes with Confederate pickets, did not reach the field until noon. They struck the Dimmock line at the point where it met the Jerusalem Plank Road, now U.S. Route 301. There, Battery 27, known as Rives's Salient, held 150 militia under Major Fletcher H. Archer. Kautz tested the position first, then held back before sending his main force, the 11th Pennsylvania Cavalry, against a home guard largely made up of boys, older men, and hospital patients recovering from wounds. Though this makeshift defense suffered heavy losses and fell back toward the city, Beauregard had by then rushed reinforcements down from Richmond in time to throw back the Union push. Hearing nothing from Gillmore's sector, Kautz assumed he had been abandoned and pulled his men out. The fighting cost the Confederates roughly 80 casualties and the Union about 40. Enraged by what he saw as Gillmore's hesitance and poor performance, Butler had him arrested. Gillmore asked for a court of inquiry, which never met, and Grant eventually gave him a new assignment, letting the matter fade away.

Grant then turned to Butler's Army of the James, despite its lackluster record at Bermuda Hundred, to spearhead the push on Petersburg. On June 14, he instructed Butler to swell Smith's XVIII Corps to 16,000 troops, folding in Kautz's cavalry, and to retrace the path used in the failed June 9 assault. With too few men to hold the whole Dimmock line, Beauregard massed 2,200 soldiers under Wise in the northeastern section, though even there his men stood an unacceptable 10 feet apart. His remaining 3,200 troops still faced Butler's force at Bermuda Hundred.

Smith's column crossed the Appomattox just after sunrise on June 15. Leading the way, Kautz's cavalry ran into unexpected resistance at Baylor's farm northeast of the city. Hinks's soldiers struck twice, seizing a cannon, though the general advance stalled until early afternoon. Smith waited until roughly 7 p.m. before launching his assault, sending forward a strong skirmish line that overran the earthworks along a stretch 3.5 mi

Initial attempts to cut the railroads (June 21-30)

Once the assault on Petersburg had failed to take the city outright, Grant turned his attention to a new goal: severing the three rail lines still feeding supplies into Petersburg and Richmond. These were the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad, the South Side Railroad running west to Lynchburg, and the Weldon Railroad (sometimes called the Petersburg and Weldon), which connected to Weldon, North Carolina, and onward to Wilmington, the Confederacy's last major port. To strike at these lines, Grant planned a far-reaching cavalry expedition against the South Side and Weldon lines, known afterward as the Wilson-Kautz Raid, while also sending a substantial body of infantry toward the Weldon line nearer his own position. Meade assigned this task to the II Corps, then under Birney's temporary command, along with Wright's VI Corps.

Fighting began on June 21 when elements of the II Corps pushed toward the railroad and clashed with Confederate horsemen. By the next morning a dangerous space had opened between the two Union corps. The II Corps kept advancing, but the VI Corps ran into troops from Wilcox's division of Hill's command and chose to dig in instead of pressing on. Mahone noticed the widening breach between the Federal corps and recognized an opportunity. Having worked as a railroad engineer before the war and surveyed this very ground south of Petersburg, he knew of a ravine that could conceal his men as they moved to attack. At three in the afternoon his troops appeared suddenly behind Barlow's division of the II Corps, throwing it into chaos and causing it to collapse almost immediately. Gibbon's division, though protected by earthworks, was likewise struck from behind, and many of its regiments broke and fled. The Federals eventually regrouped along fortifications built the previous night and held their position until nightfall brought the fighting to a close.

The following day, June 23, the II Corps pushed forward again to reclaim the ground it had lost, only to discover that the Confederates had already withdrawn from the captured works. Acting on Meade's orders, the VI Corps sent forward a strong skirmish line after ten that morning in a renewed effort to reach the Weldon Railroad. Soldiers from Brigadier General Lewis A. Grant's 1st Vermont Brigade managed to begin tearing up track before a larger Confederate infantry force fell upon them. Many Vermonters were captured, and only about half a mile of rail had been wrecked before the Federals were driven back. Meade found he could not push Wright any further and called off the effort. The cost was steep: 2,962 Union casualties against 572 Confederate. Neither side could claim a clear victory. The Confederates kept hold of the Weldon Railroad, while the Federals, though pushed back after destroying only a small stretch of track, had succeeded in extending the siege lines farther westward.

While Birney and Wright fought along the Jerusalem Plank Road, Meade sent Wilson on a separate mission to wreck as much rail line as possible to the south and southwest of Petersburg. Grant judged Wilson's 3rd Cavalry Division too small for the job on its own, especially once Meade required him to leave 1,400 troopers behind for picket duty, so he ordered Butler to add Kautz's smaller division of 2,000 men to the operation. Early on June 22, a combined force of 3,300 men and twelve guns in two batteries left Mount Sinai Church and struck the Weldon Railroad at Reams Station, seven miles south of Petersburg, wrecking track and rolling stock. Kautz's troopers then rode west to Ford's Station, where they destroyed track, locomotives, and cars belonging to the South Side Railroad.

On June 23, Wilson pushed on toward the junction with the Richmond and Danville Railroad at Burkeville, where his column ran into elements of Rooney Lee's cavalry between Nottoway Court House and Black's and White's, now called Blackstone. The Confederates hit his rear, and Colonel George A. Chapman's brigade had to fight them off. Wilson then joined Kautz along the South Side line, and together they tore up roughly thirty miles of track. The next day, as Kautz stayed behind to skirmish near