Petersburg

From June 9, 1864, through March 25, 1865, Union and Confederate forces clashed repeatedly in the fighting around Petersburg, Virginia, an extended Civil War operation now called the Richmond-Petersburg campaign. Despite its common label as the siege of Petersburg, this was no textbook siege sealing off a city's exits with surrounding fortifications, and the fighting spread well beyond Petersburg itself.

For nine months the armies dug in and fought from trenches. Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant led Union troops in an initial assault on Petersburg that failed, prompting his men to build entrenchments stretching more than 30 miles (48 km), running from Richmond's eastern edges down to the eastern and southern approaches of Petersburg. Holding Petersburg mattered enormously, since the city kept supplies flowing to Confederate General Robert E. Lee's army and to Richmond, the Confederate capital. Both sides launched raids and fought numerous battles aimed at severing the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad, and this fighting repeatedly pushed the trench lines farther outward.

By April 1865 the pressure proved too much, and Lee pulled his forces out of both cities, a withdrawal that ended in his surrender at Appomattox Court House. Historians regard the Petersburg siege as an early glimpse of the trench-bound combat that would define World War I decades later, cementing its significance in military history. The campaign also brought together the largest number of African-American soldiers to serve in the war at any one time, and they paid a steep price in blood during engagements like the Battle of the Crater and Chaffin's Farm.

Background

Grant received his promotion to lieutenant general in March 1864, taking control of the entire Union Army. Lincoln had wanted his commanders to press the Confederacy simultaneously on several fronts since the war's early days, and Grant now built a plan to make that happen. He placed Sherman in direct charge of every force operating in the West, while relocating his own command post to travel alongside Meade's Army of the Potomac in Virginia. There, Grant hoped to force Lee into a battle that would settle things once and for all. Taking Richmond, the Confederate capital, ranked as a lesser goal for him, since he understood the city would fall naturally once Lee's army was broken. The plan involved several simultaneous thrusts: Grant and Meade would press Lee from the north, Butler would push toward Richmond from the southeast, Sigel would hold the Shenandoah Valley, and Sherman would push into Georgia to beat Johnston and seize Atlanta. Meanwhile, Crook and Averell would target railroad lines supplying Confederate forces in West Virginia, and Banks was tasked with taking Mobile, Alabama.

Many of these efforts collapsed, partly because some officers had been placed under Grant for political reasons rather than proven skill. Butler's Army of the James stalled short of Richmond during the Bermuda Hundred Campaign, held back by a smaller Confederate force under Beauregard. Sigel suffered a clear defeat at New Market in May and was quickly replaced by Hunter. Banks, meanwhile, got sidetracked by the Red River Campaign and never advanced on Mobile. Yet Crook and Averell succeeded in severing the last rail connection between Virginia and Tennessee, and Sherman's push toward Atlanta, though it stretched into the fall, ultimately succeeded.

On May 4, the Army of the Potomac under Grant and Meade forded the Rapidan and entered the densely wooded region called the Wilderness, marking the start of the Overland Campaign, which would last six weeks. The fighting that followed at the Wilderness (May 5 to 7) and Spotsylvania Court House (May 8 to 21) proved brutal but settled nothing decisively; Grant could not break Lee's army, yet unlike commanders before him, he refused to pull back afterward. Instead he kept sliding his forces southeast, keeping Lee pinned on defense while edging steadily toward Richmond. For the rest of May, Grant continued probing and skirmishing with Confederate forces, trying to outflank Lee and draw him into open combat. He understood that his larger army, backed by the North's deeper manpower reserves, could outlast Lee in a drawn out war of attrition. That calculation faced its test at Cold Harbor between May 31 and June 12, where the two armies collided again near Mechanicsville. Grant chose direct confrontation, ordering a frontal assault against entrenched Confederate lines on June 3. The attack was thrown back with devastating losses. Of all his battles, Cold Harbor haunted Grant most, and afterward Northern papers took to calling him "the Butcher." Even though the campaign cost Grant roughly 50,000 casualties, about 41 percent of his force, Lee's losses ran proportionally worse: around 32,000 men, or 46 percent, losses Lee had no way to replace.

Grant shifted his army leftward once more on the night of June 12, marching toward the James River. His aim was to cross to its southern bank, sidestep Richmond entirely, and cut the city off by capturing the rail hub at Petersburg. Lee remained unaware of what Grant intended as Union engineers built a pontoon bridge stretching 2,100 feet, over which the army crossed the James between June 14 and 18. The very outcome Lee dreaded most, being trapped into defending Richmond under siege, now loomed close. Petersburg itself, a thriving city with 18,000 residents, functioned as Richmond's supply hub thanks to its position just south of the capital, its access to the James via the Appomattox River, and its status as the meeting point for five separate railroads. Because Petersburg supplied not just Richmond but the whole surrounding region, its capture by Union troops would leave Lee unable to hold Richmond at all. This marked a departure from the previous strategy of the Overland Campaign, which had centered on meeting and crushing Lee's army head on. Now Grant had chosen a target defined by geography and politics, confident that his

Role of African Americans

When the siege of Petersburg opened in June 1864, enslaved men labored on trench digging and other manual tasks for the Confederacy, even as Black soldiers fought for the Union under the banner of the United States Colored Troops within the Army of the Potomac.

Virginia's Black population stood near 549,000 at the outset of the war, meaning that one out of every six Black people in the Confederacy called Virginia home. Slavery bound 89% of that population. Petersburg itself was roughly half Black, and nearly 35% of that group lived free, giving the city the distinction of holding more free Black residents than any other Southern town at the time. Many of these free men and women built successful lives as barbers, blacksmiths, boatmen, draymen, livery stable operators, and caterers.

As Petersburg grew into a crucial supply hub feeding the Confederacy and nearby Richmond, both free Black laborers and enslaved people found themselves put to work in the war effort, including labor for the many railroads running through the city. Captain Charles Dimmock oversaw the building of a ten-mile ring of trenches and gun batteries around Petersburg in 1862, relying on both free and enslaved Black workers.

Once the siege got underway that June, Black laborers kept working on the Confederacy's behalf. Lee, in September, called for 2,000 more Black workers to bolster his labor supply. By January 11, 1865, he had gone further, writing to the Confederate Congress to push for legislation that would let enslaved men be armed and enlisted as soldiers in return for freedom. The Congress responded on March 13 by passing a law authorizing the raising of Black companies, and Davis turned it into official military policy through General Order No. 14 on March 23. Even so, freedom remained contingent on a slaveholder's approval, since the order specified that no enslaved man could be recruited without his own consent and the master's written approval granting him, as far as possible, the standing of a freedman.

Roughly 187,000 Black men wore Union uniforms over the course of the war, and nowhere was their presence thicker than at Petersburg. During the opening assault on June 15, a USCT division serving under the XVIII Corps played a part in seizing and holding part of the Dimmock line. A second Black division, attached to the IX Corps, later fought at the Battle of the Crater on July 30. By December, the various USCT units stationed around Petersburg had been reorganized into three divisions forming the XXV Corps of the Army of the James, the largest Black fighting force ever gathered during the war, fluctuating in size from about 9,000 to 16,000 troops. Across the whole Petersburg Campaign, these troops took part in six major battles and were awarded 15 of the 25 Medals of Honor given to Black soldiers throughout the Civil War.

At City Point, the Union's supply base, Black workers filled a range of roles, standing picket duty, laboring on the railroads, and performing tasks such as unloading ships, moving dirt, cutting timber, and driving piles. A number of them also served as cooks at the Depot Field Hospital.

Initial attempts to capture Petersburg

As Grant and Lee remained locked in confrontation following Cold Harbor, Benjamin Butler learned that Confederate forces had shifted northward to bolster Lee's army, thinning out the troops guarding Petersburg. Still stinging from his poor showing during the Bermuda Hundred campaign, Butler hoped a victory here might restore his reputation as a commander. In his own words, taking Petersburg "lay near my heart."

Petersburg's defenses consisted of several fortified rings, the outer one called the Dimmock line, an earthwork and trench system stretching 10 miles east of town, holding 55 artillery batteries and anchored against the river. Guarding this thin perimeter were only 2,500 Confederates under Brigadier General Henry A. Wise, a former governor of Virginia. Though the fortifications were extensive, the hilly and uneven terrain surrounding the city created gaps through which cavalry could slip past unnoticed before reaching the inner works.

On the afternoon of June 8, Butler drew up a plan involving three columns totaling 4,500 men crossing the Appomattox River. Two columns, made up of Gillmore's X Corps infantry and Hinks's black troops from the 3rd Division of XVIII Corps, would strike the Dimmock line from the east. A third force, 1,300 horsemen under Kautz, would circle around and hit the city from the southeast. Setting out on the night of June 8, the troops advanced sluggishly. The infantry did not finish crossing until 3:40 the following morning, and although both Gillmore and Hinks made contact with Confederate forces by 7 a.m., neither pressed forward. Gillmore informed Hinks he intended to attack, but only once the cavalry struck from the south.

Kautz's troopers, slowed by frequent skirmishes with enemy pickets, did not reach the field until noon. They struck the Dimmock line at the point where it met Jerusalem Plank Road, today's U.S. Route 301. There, Battery 27, known as Rives's Salient, held 150 militia under Major Fletcher H. Archer. After a probing attack, Kautz paused before launching his main assault with the 11th Pennsylvania Cavalry against a home guard largely made up of boys, older men, and wounded soldiers pulled from city hospitals. Though the defenders fell back toward the city with heavy losses, Beauregard managed to rush reinforcements from Richmond in time to throw back the Union assault. Hearing nothing from Gillmore's sector, Kautz assumed he had been abandoned and pulled his men out. The clash cost the Confederates roughly 80 casualties and the Union about 40. Enraged by what he saw as cowardice and poor judgment on Gillmore's part, Butler had him arrested. Gillmore asked for a formal inquiry, but none ever took place; Grant eventually transferred him elsewhere, and the matter faded away.

Grant chose Butler's Army of the James, despite its lackluster record at Bermuda Hundred, to spearhead the renewed push on Petersburg. On June 14, he instructed Butler to expand Smith's XVIII Corps to 16,000 troops, incorporating Kautz's cavalry, and to follow the same approach that had failed on June 9. Lacking sufficient manpower to hold the whole Dimmock line, Beauregard massed 2,200 men under Wise in the northeastern section, though even there soldiers stood an alarming 10 feet apart. His remaining 3,200 troops faced Butler's army at Bermuda Hundred.

Smith's column crossed the Appomattox just after sunrise on June 15. Kautz's cavalry, riding ahead, ran into unexpected resistance at Baylor's farm northeast of the city. Hinks's soldiers attacked twice, seizing a cannon, though the advance stalled until early afternoon. Smith waited until around 7 p.m. to begin his assault, sending forward a strong skirmish line that overran the Confederate works along a 3.5-mile stretch and pushed the defenders back to a weaker position on Harrison's Creek. Despite this success, and with the city nearly undefended before him, Smith chose to hold off until morning rather than press the advantage. By then Hancock

Initial attempts to cut the railroads (June 21-30)

After the assault on Petersburg failed to take the city, Grant turned his attention to a different goal: choking off the three rail lines still feeding both Petersburg and Richmond. These were the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad, the South Side Railroad running west to Lynchburg, and the Weldon Railroad (sometimes called the Petersburg and Weldon), which connected to Weldon, North Carolina, and ultimately to Wilmington, the last major port still open to the Confederacy. To strike at the South Side and Weldon lines, Grant planned an extensive cavalry expedition that became known as the Wilson-Kautz Raid, while simultaneously ordering a substantial body of infantry to push against the Weldon line nearer his own position. For this task Meade chose the II Corps, then under Birney's temporary command, along with Wright's VI Corps.

Fighting began on June 21 when elements of the II Corps pressed toward the rail line and clashed with Confederate horsemen. By the next morning a dangerous space had opened between the two Union corps. The II Corps kept advancing, but the VI Corps ran into troops from Wilcox's division of Hill's corps and chose to dig in instead of pressing forward. Mahone noticed the widening gap and recognized an opportunity. Having worked as a railroad engineer before the war and personally surveyed the ground south of Petersburg, he knew of a ravine that could conceal his men's approach. At three in the afternoon his troops appeared behind Barlow's division of the II Corps, catching the Federals completely off guard and shattering the line within minutes. Gibbon's division, though protected by earthworks, was likewise struck from behind, and many of its regiments broke and ran. Union soldiers eventually regrouped around fortifications built the night before and managed to hold their position as darkness brought the fighting to a close.

The following day, June 23, the II Corps moved to reclaim the ground it had lost, only to discover that the Confederates had already withdrawn from the captured works. Meade then ordered the VI Corps to send forward a strong skir