Winchester, Second

Fought from June 13 to June 15, 1863, the engagement at Winchester unfolded across Frederick County and the city itself in Virginia, forming part of the broader Gettysburg campaign of the Civil War. Confederate forces under Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell were pushing northward through the Shenandoah Valley toward Pennsylvania when his corps clashed with the Union garrison stationed there under Major General Robert H. Milroy. Milroy had disregarded a series of earlier commands instructing him to withdraw. Confederate troops overran the strongly defended lines the Federals had built around the city, forcing the defenders back to a fort positioned above the town, which they then gave up once night fell. As the Union force pulled back, the Confederates pressed the pursuit aggressively, cutting off the retreat route and unleashing chaos on the fleeing baggage train and marching columns, inflicting substantial losses. In the disorder that followed, large numbers of Union troops and supplies fell into Confederate hands, even as Milroy himself managed to escape. The defeat ranked among the harshest suffered by Union arms during the entire conflict and led to Milroy facing sharp official criticism afterward.

Background

On June 9, 1863, following the fighting at Brandy Station, Confederate commander Lee directed Ewell to take his Second Corps, some 19,000 strong within the Army of Northern Virginia, and drive Union forces from the lower Shenandoah Valley. This would open the way for Lee's larger campaign into Pennsylvania, with the Blue Ridge Mountains providing cover from Union eyes.

On the Union side, General-in-chief Henry Wager Halleck harbored serious doubts about how the Middle Department intended to defend the vital Baltimore and Ohio Railroad line. Brigadier General Benjamin Franklin Kelley, who led the so called railroad division within the Department of Harper's Ferry, had already been warned that his approach, along with strategies favored by Major General Milroy and Major General Robert C. Schenck, head of the Middle Department, would not hold up.

A dispatch dated January 5, 1863, issued from the headquarters of the Eighth Army Corps in Baltimore, recorded a telegram that had arrived that same day from Halleck. In it, the general in chief cautioned Schenck against trying to defend Winchester if faced with a substantial enemy force. Halleck made clear that he differed with both Schenck and Kelley over their shared idea of safeguarding the railroad chiefly by maintaining forward positions at Leesburg, Winchester, and Romney.

Preliminary maneuvers

Ewell's advance formed one piece of a larger design: Lee intended to shift the Army of Northern Virginia across the Potomac and into Pennsylvania, using the Blue Ridge as a natural screen against Union observation. This offensive got underway on 3 June, the day Lee declared his aim of carrying the fighting north of the Potomac, accomplishing this by slipping quietly down the Shenandoah Valley.

While the Second Corps advanced, Longstreet's First Corps moved through Snickers Gap and Hill's Third Corps passed through Ashby's Gap, both tracking Ewell's progress eastward near Berryville, Virginia. Meanwhile Stuart's cavalry division had instructions to coordinate closely with the infantry columns, staging diversions and shielding the army's right flank on the eastern side of the ridge.

From 4 through 11 June, the Second Corps departed Hamilton's Crossing and pushed toward Culpeper, Virginia, reaching it on 7 June. Word arrived that Union troops had crossed the Rappahannock in strength, prompting Lee to redirect Ewell toward Brandy Station on 9 June so he could back Stuart during the fighting there, though by the time he arrived the Federals had already pulled back. The march continued on the 10th, and the next day Early's and Johnson's divisions took the Sperryville turnpike toward Gaines crossroads while Rodes' division followed the Richmond road in the direction of Flint Hill. That evening, after conferring with Lee, Ewell sat down with Early, Johnson, and staff topographer Jedediah Hotchkiss to map out routes and settle on a broader scheme aimed at seizing Winchester and Martinsburg.

On 12 June the corps pushed through Chester's Gap southeast of Front Royal, coming in along what is now U.S. 522, the Front Royal Pike. Here Brig. Gen. Albert G. Jenkins and his cavalry brigade joined the column. Ewell, Early, and Jenkins worked out a divided approach, splitting the corps into two separate thrusts.

One force, comprising Rodes' division along with Jenkins' cavalry, would swing north through Berryville toward Martinsburg, West Virginia. Ewell hoped this column might trap McReynolds and his 1,800 troops garrisoned at Berryville before continuing on to Martinsburg. The second and larger thrust, made up of Early's and Johnson's divisions plus the 16th Virginia Cavalry Battalion under Maj. James H. Nounnan, would drive northwest toward Winchester itself, targeting the fortified positions there held by Milroy's garrison of six to eight thousand men.

By nightfall on the 12th, Rodes had reached Stone Bridge, some five miles north of Front Royal, Johnson's division had come up to Cedarville, and Early's troops were camped near the Shenandoah River.

Months earlier, by April, Milroy had held Winchester for four months, and his inability to fully suppress Confederate raiding through the lower valley had alarmed Schenck, commander of the Middle Department, enough that he ordered a brigade sent east to Berryville. That post allowed Union forces to watch the Shenandoah crossings and keep an eye on Confederate movement through Snicker's and Ashby's gaps along the valley's eastern edge. Milroy accordingly placed McReynolds' brigade there, with instructions to fall back to Winchester the moment a signal gun fired.

Around Winchester itself, Milroy kept pickets and videttes stationed too close to the town, a consequence of repeated harassment of his patrols

Main battle

Ewell's familiarity with Winchester ran deep, since he and his commanders had already fought over this same ground under Lt. Gen. Jackson during the earlier engagement here, giving them a working knowledge of the fortifications and the terrain features masking approaches on the western edge of town. With that knowledge in hand, Ewell divided his two-division strike force into a pair of flanking columns.

On the western side, Early's Division marched with Brown's artillery battalion, the 1st Maryland Infantry Battalion, and the Baltimore Light Artillery, heading toward Newtown along the Valley Pike. Ewell wanted this column to come at Winchester from the southwest and probe for openings along the ridges northwest and west of town. Meanwhile, on the eastern side, Johnson's Division and the 16th Virginia cavalry battalion pushed northwest toward Winchester via the Front Royal Pike, tasked with staging demonstrations to pull Federal attention away from what Early was doing.

Johnson's men, advancing along the Front Royal Pike, pushed Federal pickets away from the Opequon River crossing at Parkins Mill Battery around 8:30 in the morning, then clashed with Federal cavalry near Hoge Run about an hour later. Heavy guns from Fort Milroy stopped Johnson's progress just before noon, and artillery fire soon opened up against Federal guns positioned near Hollinsworth Mill. Rather than press further, Johnson held his ground there, waiting for Early to arrive and coordinate the attack.

Early's Division, per Ewell's orders, crossed westward through Ninevah toward Newtown before turning north on the Valley Pike. Fighting broke out near Kernstown around midday, involving both infantry and artillery. By roughly four in the afternoon, Early's men had driven Federal skirmishers from the tollgate on the Valley Pike, and after some brief exchanges the Federal troops pulled back across Abrams Creek.

Despite all this fighting, Milroy remained unaware that he faced Lee's entire Second Corps. He pulled his troops into the three forts guarding Winchester. General-in-chief Henry W. Halleck, worried about precisely this outcome, had instructed Schenck to order Milroy back to Harpers Ferry. Schenck did raise the idea of pulling out with Milroy, but gave no firm command to do so, since Milroy had persuaded him that Winchester's defenses were solid. Milroy himself had already dismissed the warnings from Washington, trusting that his fortifications were strong enough to hold against either a direct assault or a prolonged siege.

Ewell, drawing on reliable information from contacts in the lower Valley, had already recognized that Milroy's escape route could be sealed off. Acting on plans laid out on June 11, he sent Rodes' Division toward Martinsburg by way of Berryville to cut that path. That afternoon Rodes' Division and Jenkins' cavalry brigade, having reached Berryville, tried to trap McReynolds' Brigade there. Signal guns fired from Milroy's forces in Winchester warned McReynolds in time,

Medals of Honor

During the Second Battle of Winchester, three soldiers earned recognition through the Medal of Honor for what they did in combat, among them a single officer and two men serving in the ranks.

The officer was 2nd Lt. James R. Durham of the 12th West Virginia Infantry. The other two honorees came from the 122nd Ohio Infantry: Musician John T. Patterson and Pvt. Elbridge Robinson.

Aftermath

The casualty figures kept by both sides after the fight line up almost exactly. Ewell's own tally listed the spoils as twenty three artillery pieces (nearly all rifled), four thousand prisoners, three hundred loa