Sheridan's Valley Campaign

• Lieutenant General Jubal A. EarlySummit Point, Smithfield Crossing, Berryville, Opequon, Fisher's Hill, Cedar Creek
• Lieutenant General Richard AndersonGuard Hill
• Major General Thomas RosserTom's Brook

• Brigadier General Wesley MerrittGuard Hill, Smithfield Crossing
• Major General Philip SheridanSummit Point, Berryville, Opequon, Fisher's Hill, Cedar Creek
• Brigadier General Alfred TorbertTom's Brook
• Major General Horatio WrightCedar Creek

Initial movements

Command of the Valley District fell to Jackson on November 4, 1861, and he set up his headquarters at Winchester. He had taught at Virginia Military Institute not long before and had gained sudden fame as a hero at First Manassas, but he also knew this region well, since he had spent many years living there. Under him were the Stonewall Brigade along with several militia units. Brig. Gen. William W. Loring arrived in December with 6,000 additional men, yet even with this reinforcement Jackson lacked the numbers needed to launch an offensive. As Banks stayed positioned north of the Potomac, Col. Turner Ashby, who led Jackson's cavalry, conducted raids against the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. During the Romney Expedition in early January 1862, Jackson clashed without clear result against two modest Union garrisons at Hancock, Maryland, and at Bath.

Toward the end of February, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan directed Banks, now strengthened by Brig. Gen. John Sedgwick, to cross the Potomac and shield the canal and railroad from Ashby's attacks. Banks pushed south toward Winchester at the same time Shields's division advanced from the Romney area. At this point Jackson's force served as the left flank of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston's army, and once Johnston pulled back from Manassas to Culpeper that March, Jackson found his position at Winchester cut off from support. He started retreating farther up the Valley, toward the elevated terrain at its southwestern end, so that he could guard the flank of Johnston's army as it withdrew from the Centreville-Manassas region to defend Richmond. Had Jackson not made this move, Banks's Federal troops could have pushed through gaps in the Blue Ridge Mountains to strike Johnston directly. Jackson had already left Winchester by March 12, 1862, when Banks took the town, and Jackson proceeded at an unhurried pace some 42 miles along the Valley Pike until reaching Mount Jackson. Then on March 21, word reached Jackson that Banks was dividing his forces: two divisions, commanded by Brig. Gens. John Sedgwick and Alpheus S. Williams, were heading back toward Washington, D.C., which would free additional Union soldiers to join Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's campaign against Richmond on the Peninsula. Meanwhile the last division, led by Brig. Gen. James Shields, held Strasburg to protect the lower northeastern Valley, though reports suggested this force was pulling back toward Winchester. Banks himself made arrangements to depart the Valley on March 23.

Valley campaign

Johnston had instructed Jackson to keep Banks and his troops from quitting the Valley, and word arrived that the Federals seemed to be doing exactly that. In response Jackson reversed course and pushed his men through one of the war's most punishing forced marches, covering 25 miles northeast on March 22 before closing another 15 to reach Kernstown by the morning of March 23. On March 22, Ashby's horsemen clashed with Union troops, and during the fighting a shell fragment struck Shields, breaking his arm. Wounded as he was, Shields still dispatched a portion of his division south of Winchester while sending a brigade marching north, giving the impression the Federals were pulling out of the region entirely. In truth that brigade stopped nearby and waited in reserve. Shields handed tactical control of his division to Col. Nathan Kimball, though he continued firing off messages and instructions to Kimball throughout the fight that followed. Southern sympathizers in Winchester passed along faulty intelligence to Turner Ashby, claiming Shields had left behind just four regiments and a handful of cannon, roughly 3,000 troops, and that even this remaining force was set to march for Harpers Ferry the next morning. Believing this, Jackson pressed north aggressively with his own division, now down to about 3,000 men after stragglers had fallen away during the march, with no idea he was actually about to engage a force nearing 9,000.

Marching up from Woodstock, Jackson reached the Union lines at Kernstown around eleven in the morning on Sunday, March 23. He dispatched Ashby to stage a diversion against Kimball's men along the Valley Turnpike, while his primary striking force, composed of Col. Samuel Fulkerson's brigade and Brig. Gen. Richard B. Garnett's Stonewall Brigade, pushed toward the Union guns positioned on Pritchard Hill. When Fulkerson's leading brigade was thrown back, Jackson chose instead to swing around the Union right, roughly two miles west onto Sandy Ridge, a spot that looked unguarded. Kimball responded by shifting Col. Erastus B. Tyler's brigade westward to block the move, but Fulkerson's men got to a stone wall overlooking a clearing on the ridge first.

Near four o'clock that afternoon, Tyler launched an assault against Fulkerson and Garnett along a tight stretch of ground. For a time the outnumbered Confederates held their own, pouring volleys from behind the stone wall. By the time Jackson grasped just how large the opposing force truly was and sent reinforcements to his left, it was nearly six in the evening, and Garnett's men had already exhausted their ammunition. Garnett pulled the Stonewall Brigade back, exposing Fulkerson's right side. Jackson attempted to rally his soldiers and hold the ground, but the effort failed, and the whole Confederate line collapsed into retreat. Kimball did not organize any real pursuit.

The toll came to 590 Union casualties, made up of 118 killed, 450 wounded, and 22 captured or missing, against 718 on the Confederate side, with 80 dead, 375 wounded, and 263 taken prisoner or unaccounted for. Even though the Federals had won the field, Lincoln grew uneasy over Jackson's boldness and what it might mean for the safety of Washington. He ordered Banks back into the Valley along with Alpheus Williams's division. Worried that Jackson could push into western Virginia and threaten Maj. Gen. John C. Frémont, Lincoln also had Brig. Gen. Louis Blenker's division pulled from McClellan's Army of the Potomac and sent to bolster Frémont's forces. This episode also led Lincoln to revisit McClellan's arrangements for guarding Washington while the Peninsula campaign moved forward, and he judged the defenses inadequate. Eventually he directed that Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell's corps, then heading south toward Richmond to support McClellan, stay near the capital instead. McClellan would later argue that losing these troops kept him from seizing Richmond during the campaign. Although Kernstown marked the sole defeat of Jackson's military career, the shift in Union deployments it triggered ended up working in the Confederacy's favor strategically.

Following the engagement, Jackson placed Brig. Gen. Richard B. Garnett under arrest for pulling

Aftermath

Following Jackson's triumphs at Cross Keys and Port Republic, Federal troops began pulling back from the region. Frémont returned his column to Harrisonburg, only to discover, to his irritation, that Lincoln's instructions bar