Assunpink

Fought on January 2, 1777, amid the wider struggle for American independence, the clash at Assunpink Creek is sometimes called the Second Battle of Trenton. It pitted American forces against British troops in and around Trenton, New Jersey, and ended with the Americans coming out on top.

After Washington's men triumphed at Trenton in the early hours of December 26, 1776, the general and his officers anticipated that the British would strike back hard. Rather than retreat, Washington and his council chose to confront this expected assault right there in Trenton, positioning their defenses along the southern bank of the Assunpink Creek.

In the wake of the December 26 engagement, Cornwallis marched his troops southward to press the advantage. He stationed 1,400 soldiers under Mawhood back in Princeton while pushing toward Trenton on January 2 with a force of roughly 5,000 men. His progress, however, was hampered considerably by American sharpshooters under Hand, who harassed the column with skirmishing along the way, delaying the lead British units until dusk before they finally reached the town. Cornwallis then launched three separate attacks against the American lines, and each one was thrown back. Rather than press further that night, he opted to hold off and settle matters the following day. Washington, however, had other plans: under cover of darkness, he maneuvered his army around the British encampment and struck Mawhood's garrison at Princeton the next morning. The loss that followed convinced the British to pull back from nearly all of New Jersey as winter set in.

Background

During the dark hours spanning December 25 and 26, 1776, Washington led his Continental forces across the icy Delaware, striking the Hessian garrison at Trenton once dawn broke on the 26th. Hemmed in on all sides, the Hessians fell quickly to the assault. That same afternoon, Washington ferried his troops back over the river to their Pennsylvania encampment. Four days later, on December 30, he marched the army once more toward Trenton, this time positioning his men along the southern bank of Assunpink Creek.

Prelude

Washington found himself in a difficult position at Trenton. The enlistments of nearly all his soldiers would run out on December 31, and he understood the army might simply dissolve unless he could persuade the men to remain. For that reason, on December 30 he made a personal plea to his troops, offering ten dollars to any who would stay for another month. He invited volunteers to raise their firelocks, yet not a single man responded. Undeterred, he turned his horse and addressed the assembled ranks directly, telling them that they had already done everything asked of them and more, but that their country, their families, their homes, and everything precious to them now hung in the balance. He acknowledged their exhaustion from hardship and fatigue, but explained that the army could not afford to release them. He urged that remaining just one additional month would offer them a chance to serve liberty and country in a way no other moment could provide. Silence followed at first, until a lone soldier finally stepped forward. Most of the rest soon joined him, and only a small number remained apart from the group.

The following day, January 1, 1777, funds sent by the Continental Congress reached Trenton, allowing the troops to be paid. Along with the money came several resolutions from Congress, one of which granted Washington authority resembling that of a military dictator. Having decided to make his stand at Trenton, Washington summoned General John Cadwalader, then stationed at Crosswicks with 1,800 militiamen, to bring his force to join him. On December 31 word reached Washington that General Cornwallis was advancing with an army of 8,000 men intending to strike at Trenton.

In response, Washington directed his troops to construct defensive works running along the southern bank of the Assunpink Creek, southeast of the town itself, near where the Trenton Transit Center now stands. These fortifications stretched roughly three miles along the lower portion of the stream. Joseph Reed, one of Washington's aides, warned him that fords existed farther upstream that British forces could use to cross and threaten the right flank of the American position. Escape across the Delaware was not an option, since the available boats were stationed several miles upstream. Washington informed his officers that the army's location was temporary and that a repositioning was already planned.

Meanwhile, Cornwallis, who had intended to sail back to Britain, found his leave revoked. He traveled to Princeton to meet General James Grant, who had already brought 1,000 troops there as reinforcements. Once he arrived, both Grant and Carl von Donop persuaded him to launch a combined assault on Trenton.

By January 1, 1777, Cornwallis and his forces had reached Princeton. The next day, he left a portion of his men there under Charles Mawhood while leading the remaining 5,500 troops toward Trenton, eleven miles away. His force marched in three columns and carried 28 cannon. Upon reaching Maidenhead, now known as Lawrenceville, Cornwallis detached Colonel Alexander Leslie along with 1,500 soldiers, instructing them to hold their position there until morning.

Battle

At the head of his forces, Cornwallis stationed a screen of Hessian jägers alongside British light infantry. Earlier, two days prior, Washington had ordered troops led by Matthias Alexis Roche de Fermoy to establish a forward line midway between the two towns, meant to slow the enemy's approach. When the British neared, Fermoy, intoxicated, made his way back to Trenton, leaving Colonel Edward Hand to assume command in his place.

Once the British drew within firing distance, American sharpshooters unleashed their weapons. They found shelter among trees, gullies, and curves along the roadway, repeatedly withdrawing and shooting from concealment whenever the British attempted to organize into formation. Forced eventually to give up his post near Five Mile Run, Hand relocated to a densely forested spot along the southern bank of Shabakunk Creek. There his men hid so effectively among the trees that the crossing British troops never spotted them until rifles fired at extremely close range. This barrage left the British convinced they faced Washington's full force, prompting them to form ranks and haul cannon into position. A thorough search of the woods lasting thirty minutes turned up nothing, for Hand's men had already slipped away to another spot.

Come three o'clock that afternoon, British forces had pushed to within roughly half a mile of Trenton, reaching a gully called Stockton Hollow, where American troops were assembling yet another defensive line. Washington's goal was simple: delay the enemy until darkness fell, since night would keep the British from striking his positions south of Assunpink Creek. Once their artillery was set, British forces struck at Hand's fresh position, forcing him into a gradual retreat toward Trenton, his men firing as they went from behind houses. When his troops reached the creek, Hessian soldiers charged forward with bayonets drawn, throwing the retreating Americans into disarray. Spotting the confusion, Washington galloped through the mass of soldiers pressing across the bridge, calling for Hand's rear guard to fall back and reform beneath the protection of American guns.

With the British readying their assault against the American lines, both

American withdrawal

Upon reaching Trenton with the bulk of his forces, Cornwallis convened his officers to weigh whether an assault should proceed without delay. William Erskine, serving as his quartermaster general, pressed for immediate action, remarking that if Washington possessed the qualities of a true commander, his forces would surely vanish before dawn. James Grant took the opposing view, contending that the Americans had no viable escape route while British soldiers, exhausted from the day's marching, would fare better attacking after some rest. Though reluctant to postpone matters until sunrise, Cornwallis judged this course wiser than launching a nighttime assault. He remarked that they finally had the old fox cornered and would cross over to capture him come morning. With that settled, he positioned his forces on elevated ground north of the town to wait out the night.

Throughout those dark hours, Henry Knox directed sporadic artillery fire into Trenton, a tactic meant to unsettle the waiting British ranks. Washington, meanwhile, gathered his own officers for deliberation. He proposed advancing along an obscure route known as the Quaker road, which led toward Princeton, and his officers endorsed striking the British garrison stationed there. The march toward Princeton commenced at two in the morning on January 3. Behind him, Washington stationed a detachment of 500 soldiers along with a pair of cannons, tasked with sustaining the campfires and producing the sounds of digging with picks and shovels, creating the illusion of entrenchment. Come daylight, this remaining force had also slipped away, so that when British troops finally advanced to attack, they discovered the American camp entirely abandoned.

Aftermath

Washington's forces arrived at Princeton on the morning of January 3. What followed was a short engagement that ended in a clear rout of the British stationed there, with a large portion of Mawhood's garrison falling into American hands. Having suffered this setback, the third such loss within a ten day span, Cornwallis found himself answering to General William Howe, who responded by pulling the army back from the southern part of New Jersey, retreating almost all the way to New York. The withdrawal was carried out accordingly, though a forward post remained at New Brunswick. For his part, Washington directed his troops toward Morristown, where they would settle into winter quarters.