Germantown

The clash at Germantown ranked among the significant confrontations of the Philadelphia campaign during the American Revolutionary War, taking place on October 4, 1777, in Germantown, Pennsylvania. General Sir William Howe's British forces faced off against General George Washington's Continental Army in this encounter.

Howe had already bested Washington's forces twice, first at Brandywine on September 11 and again at Paoli on September 20. These victories set the stage for Howe to outmaneuver his opponent and capture Philadelphia, then serving as the American capital, on September 26. Rather than keeping his entire army in the city, Howe stationed roughly 3,000 soldiers there as a garrison and marched the remainder to Germantown, a community on the city's outskirts at that time. Washington saw an opportunity in this split of British strength and resolved to strike. His strategy involved sending four distinct columns converging simultaneously on the British position. Militia troops numbering 3,000 made up the two flanking columns, while regulars filled out the other formations: Nathanael Greene commanded the center-left, John Sullivan led the center-right, and Lord Stirling headed the reserve. Washington hoped to catch the British off guard and crush them decisively, echoing his earlier triumph over the Hessians at Trenton. On the British side, Howe positioned his light infantry along with the 40th Foot as forward pickets across Germantown's approach. Within the main encampment, command was divided between Wilhelm von Knyphausen, who held the left, and Howe, who took personal charge of the right flank.

Thick fog descended on the battlefield, throwing the advancing American forces into disarray. Sullivan's men nonetheless fought their way through and broke the British picket line after fierce fighting. Obscured by the mist, roughly 120 soldiers from the 40th Foot took refuge inside Cliveden and fortified it. As the American reserve advanced, Washington chose to order repeated attacks against this stronghold, each one failing and costing many lives. Sullivan's forces, having pushed several hundred yards past the mansion, began losing morale as ammunition dwindled and the sound of cannon fire erupted from their rear. During the retreat that followed, Anthony Wayne's division ran into troops from Greene's wing, which had arrived late, all obscured by the same heavy fog. Each side believed the other to be the enemy, exchanging fire before both pulled back in confusion. Elsewhere on the field, Greene's left-center column managed to push back the British right flank successfully. Yet once Sullivan's column had been driven back, the British left flank turned and outmaneuvered Greene's position. The militia columns on either flank accomplished little beyond drawing British attention momentarily, gaining no real ground before retreating entirely.

Though the battle ended in American defeat, it carried consequences abroad. France, already swayed by the American triumph over Burgoyne at Saratoga, chose to increase its support for the American cause. For his part, Howe declined to press his advantage by chasing the retreating Americans, focusing instead on clearing British obstacles from the Delaware River near Red Bank and Fort Mifflin. He later tried to lure Washington into another engagement at White Marsh, but when this failed, he retreated back to Philadelphia. Washington, having preserved his army despite the loss, led his troops to Valley Forge, where they spent the winter recovering and training for future campaigns.

Background

The Philadelphia campaign opened poorly for the American side. Cooch's Bridge, Brandywine, and Paoli each brought defeat to Washington's Continental Army. On September 20, after handing Anthony Wayne's division a painful setback at Paoli, the British pushed north toward Valley Forge and then turned west, reaching the bridge at French Creek. By then Howe's right wing stood opposite Fatland Ford on the Schuylkill near Valley Forge, his left faced Gordon's Ford at French Creek, and his left center confronted Richardson's Ford. Every one of these Schuylkill crossings lay under American guard, along with a further crossing downstream at Swede's Ford near Norristown. On September 22, Sir William Erskine led a small British detachment in a feint toward the north while another force staged a show of force at Gordon's Ford. These maneuvers persuaded Washington that Howe meant to capture the supply depot at Reading and flank him on the right, so the American commander shifted his army northward. Overnight, between September 22 and 23, the British reversed course entirely, crossing the Schuylkill unopposed at both Fatland and Richardson's Fords. After pausing briefly, they pressed on downstream toward Swede's Ford, where fleeing militia left three cannons behind.

On September 26, Cornwallis marched into Philadelphia and claimed it for the British, a heavy setback for the revolutionary cause. Howe stationed 3,462 men to hold the city while pushing the remainder of his force, about 9,728 troops, north to Germantown. With the fighting season nearly finished, Howe now sought to locate and crush the main American army outright. He set up his headquarters at the Stenton Mansion, once the country residence of James Logan.

Though beaten repeatedly, Washington spotted a chance to trap and finish off the scattered British forces. He decided to strike the garrison at Germantown as one final effort before the army settled into winter quarters. The plan he devised was intricate and daring: four columns would converge on the British position from separate directions under cover of night, aiming for a pincer movement on both flanks. Washington hoped to catch the British off guard just as the Hessians had been surprised at Trenton.

Germantown itself was a small village built of stone houses, stretching from present day Mount Airy in the north down to what is today Market Square in the south. From Market Square, Schoolhouse Lane ran southwest for a mile and a half to where Wissahickon Creek rushed out of a steep gorge into the Schuylkill. Howe had positioned his main camp on the elevated ground along Schoolhouse and Church lanes. On the western edge of this camp, under Hessian general Wilhelm von Knyphausen, two Jäger battalions held picket duty on the heights above the Wissahickon's mouth, at the far left of the line. Near Market Square lay a Hessian brigade alongside two brigades of British regulars. Further east, two more British brigades commanded by General James Grant had made camp, supported by two dragoon squadrons and the 1st Light Infantry battalion. Guarding the far right flank were the Queen's Rangers, loyalist troops raised in New York.

Once darkness fell on October 3, the American army set out on a sixteen mile march toward Germantown, moving entirely under cover of night. Soldiers tucked white paper into their hats so as to recognize one another amid the confusion of darkness. The Jäger pickets failed to detect the approaching Americans, and the wider British camp remained oblivious as well. It appeared, for a time, that the Americans might recreate their earlier triumph at Trenton. Yet the night made coordination between columns nearly impossible, and the advance crawled along well behind schedule. By the time dawn broke, most of the American units had not reached their assigned positions, and with that delay went their hope of catching the British unaware.

Brigadier General John Armstrong Sr. led the Pennsylvania Militia down Manatawny Road, now Ridge Avenue, to the point where Wissahickon Creek meets the Schuylkill. From the cliffs facing Knyphausen's Hessian camp, they positioned their artillery and fired sporadically before retreating back up the road. This marked the end of Armstrong's Brigade's involvement in the fighting. Meanwhile the other three American columns pressed forward. General John Sullivan directed his column down Germantown Road. Brigadier General William Smallwood's New Jersey militia column traveled down Skippack Road, then onto Whitemarsh Church

Analysis

Several intertwined problems doomed Washington's bold scheme from the outset.

For one, Washington overestimated his men, assuming they possessed the skill and seasoning needed to execute a maneuver as intricate as this coordinated strike. The plan's viability hinged on his army's scattered columns maintaining constant contact with one another and moving with exact timing, yet the darkness of the nighttime march undermined this coordination from the start, and thick fog only compounded the confusion.

Matters grew worse when the 40th Foot mounted a fierce defense. Stephen, ignoring the orders given to him, pushed forward in a bid to seize Cliveden. Every effort to take the position failed, and Stephen would later face a court martial, ultimately losing his commission once it came to light that he had been drunk during the fighting.

Washington's underlying hope had been to replicate the triumph at Trenton on a larger scale. Under different circumstances, he might have succeeded in encircling and wiping out another significant British force. Combined with Burgoyne's collapse at Saratoga, such a victory over Howe at Germantown might have pushed Lord North and his government toward seeking peace.