Boydton Plank Road

Fought over two days, October 27 and 28, 1864, the clash at Boydton Plank Road, sometimes called Burgess Mill or First Hatcher's Run, came on the heels of the Union Army's victory at Peebles's Farm during the Petersburg siege of the American Civil War. Building on that momentum, Union forces achieved another triumph, gaining control of the Boydton and Petersburg Plank Road while severing the South Side Railroad, a vital artery supplying Petersburg, Virginia.

Background

Earlier in October, Union forces belonging to the V Corps had fought at Peebles's Farm and managed to take part of the Confederate fortifications near Hatcher's Run. Following that action, Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock's entire II Corps left its position in the trenches so it could move against the Confederates' Boydton Line. This effort was timed to coincide with another push toward the Richmond defenses along the Darbytown Road. To bolster the II Corps for the task, additional divisions from the V Corps and IX Corps joined the operation, along with Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg's cavalry division, which was already active in that part of the field.

Battle

Hancock's advance began on October 27, when his troops forded Hatcher's Run, swept aside Confederate picket lines, and swung around the enemy's flank in the direction of Burgess Mill. Gershom Mott's division, crossing the Boydton Plank Road, engaged Wade Hampton's Confederate horsemen, who threatened to sever the Federals from their main lines. A. P. Hill, responsible for Confederate defenses in this sector, responded swiftly to the danger Hancock posed. Yet once his men were dispatched to meet the Union threat, Hill's failing health made it impossible for him to remain in field command, and he passed control of his corps to Henry Heth. Heth positioned two divisions to block Hancock's path, but the Union general pressed forward along the Boydton Plank Road, forcing the Confederates back.

At this point George G. Meade and Ulysses S. Grant arrived at the scene, and Meade quickly spotted an opening between Hancock's men and the V Corps. Since the South Side Railroad remained some 6 miles (9.7 km) distant, Meade recognized that pushing further would leave the II Corps dangerously exposed, and he called a halt to Hancock's advance. Samuel W. Crawford's V Corps division received orders to join with Hancock's men but became entangled in thick timber. Grant himself rode forward to examine the Confederate fortifications and, after drawing enemy fire, concluded the position was too formidable, bringing the offensive to a close.

Since Crawford's division never managed to connect with him, Hancock's corps withdrew toward the Hatcher's Run crossing, only to discover Confederate cavalry barring the way. This left the entire II Corps stranded on the northern bank without any means of support. Recalling the disaster at Reams's Station, Heth and Hampton recognized a chance to annihilate Hancock's command outright. The Dabney Mill Road offered Hancock's sole path of escape, and Heth now moved to seize it. As afternoon waned, William Mahone's division pushed through the same tangled forest that had stalled Crawford and captured the Dabney Mill Road, while W.H.F. "Rooney" Lee's cavalry division circled behind the Union troops. Mahone's advance reached so far around the Federal flank that Thomas W. Egan's division had to reverse its entire position. Hancock found himself hemmed in on three sides with no route of withdrawal remaining.

Yet this time, unlike the debacle at Reams's Station, the II Corps held firm, and Hancock seized the opportunity before him. Mahone's success had, in fact, left his own division cut off and vulnerable. Hancock struck at both Confederate flanks simultaneously. Hampton proved unable to keep Union cavalry at bay, allowing Gregg to arrive and help crush Mahone's force. The momentum shifted entirely, and the Confederates, now facing the prospect of being surrounded themselves, fell back along the Boydton Plank Road. Hancock maintained his grip on that road, and Grant left it to his judgment whether to hold the ground or pull back to the original Union positions. Despite having beaten back the Confederate assault, Hancock's hold on the field remained precarious, and that night he led his men back to where they had started.

Aftermath

As late October gave way to winter, the two armies dug in and paused their campaigning. Confederate forces kept control of the Boydton Plank Road through those cold months. For Hancock, the fighting against Heth's men counted as a tactical success, one that went some way toward wiping away the memory of the earlier disaster at Reams's Station. Around Petersburg, the fronts stayed quiet, with nothing of consequence happening again before the year closed out.

This engagement also proved to be a final one for two respected Union commanders serving in the Army of the Potomac. Hancock stepped down from leading troops in the field the next month, his departure tied to lingering problems from the wound he had suffered at Gettysburg. Not long after, in January of 1865, David McM. Gregg surprised his colleagues by giving up his command as well. In the resignation letter he wrote, Gregg pointed to worry over being separated from home as his reason. Command of the II Corps then passed to Maj. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys, who served as Meade's chief-of-staff, and it was Humphreys who would push the offensive back toward the Boydton Plank Road when February arrived the following year.