Hatcher's Run

Background

At the start of 1865, the Union's top general, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, had good cause to feel confident about how the war was progressing. Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's forces stood ready to push north through South Carolina, while Federal soldiers had already dealt devastating blows to Confederate armies stationed in Tennessee and the Shenandoah Valley. Wilmington, the final Confederate port still open on the Atlantic, had been isolated and its fall seemed imminent. Meanwhile, Lee's principal Confederate army remained pinned down near Richmond and Petersburg, a situation largely unchanged since Grant's seventh offensive in early December had severed the Weldon Railroad down to Bellfield, some 40 miles below Petersburg.

A peace conference took place aboard the steamship River Queen while it sat anchored in Hampton Roads on February 3. Despite a friendly atmosphere, the talks fell apart rapidly. Once the Confederate representatives had made their way back to Richmond and a break in harsh winter conditions arrived, Grant grew restless for renewed action near Petersburg. He learned through intelligence that Confederate supply trains arriving at Belfield were being transferred to wagons, sent up the Meherrin River, and finally brought into Petersburg by way of Boydton Plank Road. This information led Grant to devise a plan aimed at striking the Confederate supply depot at Belfield.

Near midday on Saturday, February 4, Grant laid out his concept to Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, who led the Army of the Potomac. His proposal called for sending Maj. Gen. David McM. Gregg's cavalry on a raid toward Belfield, with orders to destroy or seize whatever they could of the supply line sustaining Confederate operations around Petersburg. An infantry corps would advance toward Stony Creek to back up the horsemen. Grant hoped the cavalry could depart by 3:00 a.m. the following morning, traveling without wagons or artillery, carrying only a handful of ambulances, and limiting food and forage to the essentials. The infantry, too, would move unencumbered, restricted to a single artillery battery per division.

Meade took time to consider this before responding at 4:30 p.m. with a significant revision. Instead of pushing Gregg's cavalry all the way to Belfield, forty miles distant, he suggested a shorter southward march of ten miles followed by a turn west toward Dinwiddie Court House along Boydton Plank Road, arguing that Confederate supply wagons could be intercepted there just as effectively. He proposed that the 5th Corps march to support the cavalry at the western terminus of Vaughan Road. Additionally, to protect Warren's rear, two divisions of the 2nd Corps under Maj. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys would advance a short distance southwest and secure two crossings of Hatcher's Run, thereby preventing Confederate troops from sallying out of their defenses along Boydton Plank Road to strike at any isolated Federal units.

Though Meade's version pursued the same aim as Grant's original concept, it called for shorter marches and kept the three Union columns in closer proximity, lessening the risk that Confederate forces could pick off one of them in isolation. It also meant that a Confederate cavalry division known to be operating near Belfield would need to travel much farther to interfere with Union movements.

Mindful of how the public might react to a failed operation, Meade posed a pointed question to Grant: whether the raid's objectives justified the disappointment that would follow if it failed to produce a dramatic result. Grant responded at 6:45 p.m., endorsing all of Meade's proposed changes and assuring him that the mission's goals mattered enough that the eventual accounts of the operation would satisfy public opinion.

Roughly an hour afterward, Meade informed Grant that all necessary orders had gone out, with cavalry set to move at 3:00 a.m. and infantry to follow at 7:00 a.m. This marked the beginning of what would become the eighth Union offensive against Petersburg.

Some later observers have suggested that this offensive sought to menace the Confederate right flank and capture the Southside Railroad, a move that, had it succeeded, would have sealed the fate of both Petersburg and Richmond. That had indeed been the purpose behind Grant's sixth offensive against Petersburg on October 27, 1864

Battle

On February 5, 1865, David Gregg's cavalry division broke camp near Fort Blaisdell at three in the morning, moving south toward Malone's Crossing before turning west for Malone's Bridge on Rowanty Creek. Roughly thirty Confederate pickets from the 13th Virginia Cavalry held that crossing. A short clash followed, and troopers of the 13th and 2nd Pennsylvania Cavalry pushed the defenders into flight, capturing more than ten of them. Maj. Gen. W. H. F. "Rooney" Lee, a son of Robert E. Lee and commander of the Confederate cavalry, happened to be inspecting the pickets at that moment and came close to being taken prisoner himself.

Pressing onward through poor winter roads, the Federal horsemen arrived at Dinwiddie C.H.

Aftermath

Grant launched his Eighth Offensive with the goal of severing the Confederate supply line running along the Belfield-Boydton Plank Road. Since it turned out this route hardly existed in any meaningful sense, judging whether the mission succeeded becomes a pointless exercise. That said, the Federals still emerged with the greater share of benefits. Without much difficulty, they seized and then held onto two crossings of Hatcher's Run that carried real strategic weight. This success allowed Union forces to stretch their Petersburg line an additional four miles to the west. This outcome had not been part of the original plan, yet it proved a considerable accomplishment, one that set the stage for the Union's ultimately triumphant Spring campaign. From Grant's standpoint, another crucial benefit emerged: Lee's army remained pinned down and engaged, breaking a lull that had settled over Petersburg since early December of 1864. Additionally, the fighting cost the Confederates manpower outright and pushed still more soldiers toward desertion.

Looking at things from the Southern side, the army had once again managed to hold off a Union push at Petersburg. Their vital lifeline, the Boydton Plank Road, stayed firmly in their hands. The two Hatcher's Run crossings, however, slipped away from them. Though their reaction to the Federal advance came sluggishly at first, Confederate forces concentrated against Humphreys' 2nd Corps late in the day on February 5, and had their tactics been sharper, they might have inflicted truly severe losses. The following day brought a rout of Warren's 5th Corps, saved from disaster only because nearby fortifications and the onset of darkness intervened. Even while bleeding valuable officers and men and operating with scant supplies, the Confederate soldiers proved they remained a fighting force to be reckoned with.

A 2025 article covers in detail what followed from Grant's Eighth Petersburg Offensive.

Hatcher's Run marked the final major clash near Petersburg before Lee made his desperate attempt to break out at Fort Stedman on March 25. That effort collapsed, and a mere fifteen days afterward, Lee laid down arms following the Battle of Appomattox Court House.

Fourteen Union soldiers earned the Medal of Honor for their actions during the fighting at Hatcher's Run: David E. Buckingham of the 4th Delaware, Abel G. Cadwallader of the 1st Maryland, Daniel G. Caldwell of the 13th Pennsylvania Cavalry, James Coey of the 147th New York, Charles Day of the 210th Pennsylvania, John C. Delaney of the 107th Pennsylvania, Jacob F. Raub of the 210th Pennsylvania, John C. Sagelhurst of the 1st New Jersey Cavalry, William Sands of the 88th Pennsylvania, Francis M. Smith of the 1st Maryland, S. Rodmond Smith of the 4th Delaware, Timothy Spillane of the 16th Pennsylvania Cavalry, John Thompson (born 1838) of the 1st Maryland, and John M. Vanderslice of the 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry.