Jackson's Valley Campaign

• Major General Thomas J. JacksonKernstown, First, McDowell, Front Royal, Winchester, First, Port Republic
• Brigadier General Humphery MarshallPrinceton Court House
• Major General Richard S. EwellCross Keys

• Colonel Nathan KimballKernstown, First
• Brigadier General Robert MilroyMcDowell
• Brigadier General Robert SchenckMcDowell
• Brigadier General Jacob D. CoxPrinceton Court House
• Colonel John R. KenlyFront Royal
• Major General Nathaniel P. BanksWinchester, First
• Major General John C. FrémontCross Keys
• Brigadier General Erastus TylerPort Republic

In the spring of 1862, Confederate Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson led a campaign through Virginia's Shenandoah Valley that would come to be called the Shenandoah Valley campaign of 1862, or simply Jackson's Valley campaign. Through daring, swift, and hard to predict movements along interior lines, Jackson pushed his 17,000 soldiers across 646 miles (1,040 km) in just 48 days. Along the way his force won a handful of smaller engagements and managed to occupy three separate Union armies totaling 52,000 men, keeping them from joining the Union push toward Richmond.

The campaign opened poorly for Jackson at the First Battle of Kernstown on March 23, 1862, where his men were tactically beaten by Col. Nathan Kimball, who belonged to Union Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks's command. Despite the loss on the field, the fight paid strategic dividends for the Confederates, since President Abraham Lincoln responded by sending additional troops to the Valley, forces that had been intended for the Peninsula campaign aimed at Richmond. After Kernstown, Jackson pulled back to establish a defensive line at Stony Creek, south of Woodstock, setting up headquarters at Narrow Passage along that creek. There he called upon Jedediah Hotchkiss, a local mapmaker, who advised abandoning the weak position at Stony Creek in favor of Rude's Hill, a modest but tactically valuable rise commanding the Valley Turnpike south of Mt. Jackson. Jackson used Rude's Hill as his base from April 2 to April 17, reorganizing his forces during that stretch. He had earlier directed Hotchkiss to produce a map of the Valley stretching from Harper's Ferry to Lexington that showed every point offering advantage or vulnerability. No thorough map of the Shenandoah Valley had existed before this, and the detailed knowledge Hotchkiss brought to the terrain gave Jackson a lasting tactical edge for the remainder of the fighting.

By May 8, after weeks of intermittent clashes with Banks, Jackson shifted his forces westward in a deceptive maneuver and struck at elements of Maj. Gen. John C. Frémont's army during the Battle of McDowell, blocking any chance that the two Union forces might unite against him. He then turned back down the Valley to face Banks once more. Moving unseen through the Luray Valley, he combined his troops with those of Maj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell and seized the Union garrison at Front Royal on May 23, forcing Banks into a northward retreat. Two days later, on May 25, Jackson bested Banks at the First Battle of Winchester and chased his retreating army all the way to the Potomac River, where it crossed into Maryland.

With fresh troops brought from eastern Virginia, Brig. Gen. James Shields retook Front Royal and set his sights on joining Frémont at Strasburg. Jackson now faced pressure from three separate Union commands. As he withdrew southward from Winchester, both Frémont and Shields gave chase. On June 8, Ewell turned back Frémont's forces at the Battle of Cross Keys. The next day he crossed the North River to unite with Jackson, and together they overcame Shields at the Battle of Port Republic, marking the campaign's conclusion.

Jackson wasted no time capitalizing on his success, undertaking forced marches to unite with Gen. Robert E. Lee ahead of the Seven Days Battles near Richmond. The boldness of his Valley operations made him, for a time, the Confederacy's most celebrated general, a distinction Lee would later claim for himself, and military organizations across the globe have continued to study the campaign since.

Background

By the spring of 1862, morale across the Confederacy had sunk to its lowest point, and hope for the South's survival appeared dim. The optimism that followed the triumphant summer of 1861, especially the First Battle of Bull Run (First Manassas), had faded rapidly. In the Western Theater, Union forces led by Ulysses S. Grant and other commanders seized Confederate lands and claimed decisive victories at Fort Donelson and Shiloh. Meanwhile, in the East, three separate Federal threats converged on Virginia: Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's enormous Army of the Potomac advanced toward Richmond from the southeast during the Peninsula campaign, Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell commanded a sizable corps ready to strike the capital from the north, and Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks's force menaced the Shenandoah Valley. Yet amid this gloom, Jackson's men remained in what was described as excellent spirits, setting the stage for the general's remarkable Valley campaign that spring, an effort that would disrupt Union strategy and breathe new life into Confederate hopes elsewhere.

The Shenandoah Valley stood as one of Virginia's most vital geographic assets during the war. This region, drained by the Shenandoah River, stretched roughly 140 miles southwest from the Potomac at Shepherdstown and Harpers Ferry, bounded by the Blue Ridge Mountains to the east and the

Union

The Union side fielded shifting numbers of troops throughout the campaign, since different armies moved into and out of the Valley at various points. Command was split among three separate organizations, a division of authority that undercut the ability of Union forces to answer Jackson effectively.

Responsibility for the Valley fell first to Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks. When the

Aftermath

Union troops pulled back once Jackson secured his victories at Cross Keys and Port Republic. Frémont retreated to Harrisonburg, only to discover, too late to be useful, orders from Lincoln instructing him not to push past that town in pursuit of Jackson. With clearer skies returning, Col. Thomas T. Munford's cavalry, serving under Jackson, dogged Frémont's retreating column, which arrived at Mount Jackson on June 11 and then moved freely to Middletown by June 14, linking up there with Banks and Brig. Gen. Franz Sigel. Shields, voicing sharp complaints about how worn out his division had become, moved at a crawl toward Front Royal before crossing the Blue Ridge on June 21 to unite with Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell.

Jackson wired Richmond asking for his army to be built up to 40,000 men so he could push offensively down the Valley and beyond the Potomac. Lee did send roughly 14,000 additional troops, but soon disclosed a different plan: he wanted Jackson brought to Richmond to help strike back against McClellan's Army of the Potomac and push it back from the city. Needing every available soldier, Lee intended for Jackson to hit the exposed right flank of McClellan's force positioned north of the Chickahominy River. Just after midnight on June 18, Jackson's troops set out toward the Peninsula. There they joined Lee's army in the Seven Days Battles, fought between June 25 and July 1, though Jackson's conduct in several of these engagements was strangely sluggish, likely a result of the toll taken by the Valley campaign and the grueling march east.

The Valley campaign's triumph made Stonewall Jackson the Confederacy's most admired commander, a status he held until Lee's fame eventually surpassed his, and news of his victories boosted civilian spirits. Through a masterful combination of speed and surprise, he drove his men across 646 miles (1,040 km) over 48 marching days, winning five major engagements with roughly 17,000 soldiers against a combined enemy strength exceeding 50,000, all by striking isolated portions of the enemy wherever he could gain a local edge in numbers. Jackson fulfilled his demanding assignment, forcing officials in Washington to hold back more than 40,000 men who would otherwise have rein