Cowpens

Near the South Carolina town of Cowpens, on January 17, 1781, Brigadier general Daniel Morgan led an American force of close to 2,000 regulars and militia to victory against roughly 1,000 British and Loyalist soldiers under Lieutenant-colonel Banastre Tarleton. This clash stands as the harshest setback the British endured on the North American continent since the Saratoga campaign of 1777.

This engagement fit into a broader British effort known as the "Southern strategy," through which the British aimed to reclaim the American South based on the notion that Loyalist support there ran deep. That notion largely proved false, and once word of the Cowpens outcome traveled, enthusiasm for the Patriot cause swelled across the region. On a tactical level, the fight proved something American commanders and statesmen had once dismissed as impossible: that militia forces, properly positioned and used, were capable of overcoming seasoned professional soldiers.

Once the fighting ended, Morgan's militia scattered and went home, leaving him with only 550 regulars still under arms. Throughout December 1780 and into January 1781, Lord Cornwallis had chased after Morgan with a force numbering 2,500. Morgan managed to stay ahead of him and, in early February, linked up with Nathanael Greene's army close to Greensboro, North Carolina, setting the stage for what would become the Battle of Guilford Court House.

Background

On October 14, 1780, Washington selected Nathanael Greene, a Quaker officer from Rhode Island, to head the Southern Department of the Continental forces. The assignment awaited him was formidable. That year had brought a series of catastrophes for Continental forces across the Carolinas, most notably the loss of an entire American army under General Benjamin Lincoln when Charleston fell under siege in May 1780. British forces subsequently took control of the city, which stood as both South Carolina's capital and the South's largest urban center. Not long afterward, General Horatio Gates saw his army routed at Camden. Some relief came in October when Patriot militia bested Loyalist forces at Kings Mountain along the northwest frontier, though British troops still held sway over most of South Carolina. Upon assuming command, Greene inherited a force listed at 2,307 men on paper, though only 1,482 were actually present, and just 949 of these were Continental regulars, primarily drawn from the celebrated and well-drilled Maryland Line.

Brigadier General Daniel Morgan arrived at Greene's Charlotte, North Carolina headquarters on December 3 to begin his service. Morgan's military background stretched back to the French and Indian War of 1754 to 1763, and when revolution broke out he had taken part in the siege of Boston in 1775. He went on to join the invasion of Canada that same year, fighting in its decisive engagement at Quebec, a battle that ended badly for the Americans and left Morgan a British prisoner. Freed through exchange in January 1777, he was given by Washington a select unit of 500 skilled marksmen that became known as Morgan's Riflemen. This force proved instrumental in the American triumph at Saratoga in 1777, a battle widely seen as reshaping the war's course. Frustration over a denied promotion, compounded by debilitating sciatica, drove Morgan to resign in 1779. His return came a year afterward, when he was elevated to brigadier general and sent back to serve in the South.

Recognizing his army's fragility, Greene concluded that direct confrontation with British forces was too risky. Instead he took the unusual step of splitting his forces, dispatching one detachment across the Catawba River both to bolster local support and to secure provisions unavailable near Charlotte. This western wing fell under Morgan's leadership, with orders to unite with militia forces beyond the Catawba and assume their command. Setting out on December 21, Morgan's mission called for him to position his troops between the Broad and Pacolet rivers while shielding local inhabitants. His force totaled 600 men, roughly 400 of them Continentals hailing mostly from Delaware and Maryland, alongside Virginia militia who had prior Continental service. Morgan's column had reached the Pacolet by Christmas Day, where sixty additional South Carolina militiamen under the seasoned partisan fighter Andrew Pickens joined his ranks, along with further militia reinforcements arriving from Georgia and the Carolinas.

At this juncture, Cornwallis was preparing to resume his North Carolina campaign, an invasion he had delayed following the setback at Kings Mountain. He viewed Morgan's presence as a menace to his flank, and false intelligence suggesting Morgan intended to strike the crucial Loyalist stronghold at Ninety Six, South Carolina, spurred him to act. Hoping both to protect the fort and eliminate Morgan's threat, Cornwallis dispatched Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton's cavalry westward through orders issued January 1, 1781, followed by a second directive on January 2.

Tarleton's record in British colonial service had been remarkable. He had led the small party that captured American General Charles Lee in New Jersey back in December 1776. His performance at the Charleston siege and at Camden had earned him distinction, and as commander of the British Legion, a combined infantry and cavalry unit made up of Loyalist Americans considered among the finest British troops operating in the Carolinas, he had achieved victories at Monck's Corner and Fishing Creek. His reputation among colonists turned dark, however, following his win at Waxhaws, where accusations arose that his soldiers killed American troops who had already surrendered. According to fleeing Patriots, at least one man who had given up his arms picked up a weapon again and fired on Tarleton. In his own 1781 account, Tarleton claimed

Battle

Just before dawn broke, the leading elements of Tarleton's force came out of the trees facing the American lines. Tarleton sent his dragoons forward against the first rank of skirmishers, and these riflemen answered with fire that dropped fifteen of the horsemen. The dragoons fell back at once, and Tarleton, without waiting to assess how the Americans were arrayed or letting the remainder of his infantry and cavalry reserve clear the tree line, ordered an immediate infantry assault. He pressed the attack on the skirmish line without delay, bringing his main force forward along with his two small grasshopper guns. The American skirmishers held their fire as they pulled back, joining the second line where Pickens's militia waited.

The British pushed forward once more and this time reached the militia, who followed their instructions and fired two volleys into the advancing troops, aiming especially at officers. This staggered Tarleton's men, and officers made up 40 percent of the casualties they suffered in the exchange. Still, the British rallied and kept moving ahead. Tarleton directed Ogilvie, one of his officers, to lead a mounted charge against what looked like a broken American force. Ogilvie's dragoons rode forward in good order, slowed briefly by musket fire from the militia but never stopping their advance. As planned, Pickens's men appeared to break and run, slipping around the American left toward the rear once they had discharged their second volley.

Believing the retreat of the first two lines signaled a complete rout, the British pressed forward straight into the third line, where Maryland and Delaware regulars waited atop the rise. Orders went out for the 71st Highlanders to swing around and strike the American right flank. Howard caught sight of this maneuver and told the Virginia militia guarding that flank to wheel around and meet the Scots head on. Amid the chaos of combat, however, his command was garbled, and the militia began pulling back instead. By now it was 7:45 in the morning, nearly an hour into the fighting. The British troops, exhausted and out of formation, spotted the Virginians retreating on the American right and took this as proof the Americans were fleeing. They surged forward, abandoning their formation and rushing ahead in disorder.

At that moment Morgan called for a volley. The Virginia militia under Howard, whom the British had taken for beaten men, halted their withdrawal and spun around to face the enemy. From no farther than thirty yards, they fired into the oncoming British with devastating results, stopping the pursuit cold. Howard then gave the order to fix bayonets, and the Continentals in the center launched a bayonet charge as instructed. Caught off guard by this sudden reversal, Tarleton's men began to break apart. Some threw down their arms on the spot while others turned and bolted. Howard's soldiers pressed forward and captured both of the British grasshopper cannons. Meanwhile Washington's horsemen swept around from the far side of the American left and struck the British right flank and rear. Pickens's militia, now regrouped, emerged from behind the hill and completed a full circle around the American position, falling upon the 71st Highlanders from behind on Tarleton's left. Howard also ordered the Virginia militia, whose earlier retreat had lured the British into their doomed charge, to reverse course and strike the Highlanders from the opposite side.

The suddenness of this counterattack, combined with the sight of American militia reappearing on the flank where Tarleton's worn out troops had expected their own cavalry to be, broke the British will to continue. Close to half the British and Loyalist foot soldiers dropped to the ground, wounded or not, all fight drained out of them. Babits attributes this sudden collapse to what he calls combat shock, the sudden weight of exhaustion, hunger, and low morale catching up with the men all at once. Surrounded on both sides in a maneuver one historian likened to a miniature version of the ancient Battle of Cannae, many gave themselves up.

As Tarleton's center and right gave way, only a handful of the 71st Highlanders continued fighting against a portion of Howard's men. Recognizing how dire things had become, Tarleton galloped back to the one force he still had intact, his British Legion cavalry, and ordered them into the fight. Instead, they abandoned the field entirely. The Highlanders, hemmed in by militia and Continentals on all sides, laid down their arms. In a last effort to salvage something from the battle, Tarleton gathered roughly forty horsemen and attempted to recover

Aftermath

Morgan's men captured 712 prisoners, and 200 of these had wounds. On the British side, 110 officers and soldiers under Tarleton died in the fighting, and every one of his gunners was either killed or badly hurt. Looking at the wider picture, some of Cornwallis' finest units had been shattered or left much weaker as a result of the engagement. Tarleton's brigade lost 86 percent of its men and ceased to function as a fighting unit altogether. Howard later recalled that McArthur, an officer of the 71st Highlanders who had become an American captive, remarked that he had held a commission before Tarleton was even born, and that the finest soldiers in the army had been handed to "that boy" only to be thrown away. One American held as a prisoner later described how, when Tarleton finally reached Cornwallis and told him what had happened, Cornwallis drove his sword into the earth and leaned upon it until the blade broke.

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